1

EXAMINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CRIME AND MAJOR WEATHER
EVENTS AND DISASTERS IN THE 10 LARGEST CITIES IN TEXAS
By Daniel Augusto

A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment
Of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

Liberty University, Lynchburg, VA
August 20, 2021

APPROVED BY:

Jared Linebach, PhD, Committee Chair

Jared Perry, PhD, Committee Member

2
ABSTRACT
This dissertation uses Social Disorganization Theory as a foundation to examine the relationship
between yearly days with a major weather event or disaster and crime in the 10 largest cities in
Texas. Multiple regressions and moderation analyses were conducted, with models that
incorporated total Days with Disaster or major weather event, Social Disorganization, Population
Density, and Disaster Consequences predicting all Index Crimes other than Arson. Days with
Disaster significantly predicted Robbery, Murder, Rape, Burglary, and Auto Theft, but did not
significantly predict Larceny or Assault. Additionally, Social Disorganization and Population
Density were often found to predict crime. Moderation analysis also revealed that Social
Disorganization increases the effect of Days with Disaster on Burglary rates. These findings
indicate that, on average, large cities can expect increases to crime as days with major weather
events and disasters increase, particularly when those increases are paired with high levels of
Social Disorganization. These findings also suggest a need for police managers in disaster-prone
communities to establish a disaster policing paradigm, with a focus on training for disasterspecific concerns, and preparation for crimes that increase during disasters, particularly in the
more disorganized neighborhoods. This research also supports the establishment of disaster as a
Social Disorganization Theory factor. A Unified Disaster Crime Theory is also proposed. Future
disaster crime research should incorporate disaster phases timing, as well as compliance with
disaster warnings.
Keywords: Disaster crime, Social Disorganization Theory, disaster policing, Unified
Disaster Crime Theory
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Overview
This chapter provides a background on crime during disasters and major weather events.
After providing some background and a problem statement, the chapter will discuss the purpose
of the study. Next, the study's significance will be addressed, and the research questions will be
listed. The chapter concludes with some definitions of key terms to be used in the study. The
background section below will begin to educate the reader on the overall topic of crime during
major weather events and disasters.
Background
Hurricane Harvey struck coastal Texas in August of 2017. Upon its conclusion, after
adjusting for inflation, Hurricane Harvey was the second most costly hurricane in United States
(U.S.) history (Blake & Zelinski, 2018; NOAA, 2020). Harvey also resulted in 89 deaths
(NOAA, 2020), and caused the highest number of direct deaths from a tropical cyclone in Texas
since 1919 (Blake & Zelinski, 2018). Despite Hurricane Harvey’s impacts, it is only one of
several disasters and major weather events that have struck coastal Texas during the last few
decades. Of course, coastal Texas is certainly not the only region of the country afflicted by
recurring major weather events and disasters. Florida faced more than 50 named weather events
and hurricanes in 2004 and 2005 alone (NOAA, n.d.). Additionally, the Northeastern region of
the U.S. has a history of consistently battling major weather events (NOAA, n.d.) while
tornadoes are known to frequently strike throughout the Midwest U.S. (NSSL, n.d.).
Major metropolitan areas within a region also face major weather events and disasters.
The greater Houston, Texas area serves as an example of a major metropolitan area that
experienced several major weather events and disasters during recent decades. Hurricane Harvey

16
struck Houston in 2017 and Hurricane Ike hit Houston almost exactly ten years earlier.
Individual disasters and major weather events have been associated with increases to some crime
rates and decreases to other crime rates (HCFCD, 2018). However, despite several regions and
urban areas facing repeated major weather events, Prelog (2016) is the only researcher located in
recent years who studied disaster frequency as part of his crime research. Additionally, no
research was located that explores or examines the relationship between number of days with a
major weather event or disaster and crime. Having discussed some of the background on the
topic, focus will shift to the research topic.
Problem Statement
One might think that disaster research would be among the top priorities for researchers
in the U.S. However, despite disasters being extremely costly in terms of life and resources
(Manove et al., 2019), and seemingly beset by counter-productive myths; limited disaster
research exists to present an accurate picture of disaster (Mostafavi, & Ganapati, 2019).
Additionally, investigation into disaster crime is even further limited by other challenges
(Spencer, 2017). Several unique challenges limit emergency management research, stifling the
development of new emergency management knowledge (Mukherji et al., 2014). Given the
consequences of disasters and unique challenges that limit emergency management research,
researchers should take advantage of opportunities to facilitate further understanding of disasters
and society’s reactions to them. That increased understanding is also important to clarify which
alleged disaster occurrences are myths and which are realities and allow responders and disaster
victims to prepare for disaster realities instead of disaster myths. This research is intended to aid
in that effort to understand disasters and increase the limited knowledge of disaster crime to
minimize negative consequences from future disasters.
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One could also argue that disaster crime is inherently egregious and particularly upsetting
to our sensibilities because it further victimizes people who are already affected by disasters in
what is likely their greatest time of need. This has prompted public statements from authority
figures warning against disaster crime (Paulson, 2017). Given the contemptible nature of disaster
crime as an additional source of victimization within the already important research topic of
disaster, researchers should prioritize disaster crime studies. Such research could produce
knowledge to help reduce further victimization of people during their most vulnerable time. This
research is meant to perhaps assist in the effort to reduce victimization during disasters.
However, like emergency management theoretical research (Mostafavi, & Ganapati,
2019), the long-term relationship between crime and disaster is understudied (Prelog, 2016).
Additionally, any attempts to build on prior disaster crime research will likely continue to be
hindered by inconsistent findings among past researchers (Spencer, 2017; Breetzke & Andresen,
2018). One might argue that the inconsistent research findings on disaster crime are a byproduct
of researchers necessarily focusing on specific disaster events, as opposed to a more general
understanding of relationships between disaster and crime. This research is partially meant to
address that problem and help fill that research gap. Much of the recent disaster crime research
focused on individual disaster events and, although necessary, that focus has also created a blindspot relative to days with major weather events and disasters as another critical component of
disaster research. This study is also intended to address that problem by examining the
relationship between the number of days with a major weather event or disaster, and crime rates.
Finally, a research gap exists relative to a specific focus on urban areas or cities as the
unit of analysis on longitudinal research. Although some disaster crime studies have focused
attention on one single city after a single disaster, such as New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina
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(Frailing & Harper, 2017), much of the recent longitudinal research uses the county as the unit of
analysis (Spencer, 2017; Prelog, 2016). However, disaster impacts are likely to be most
magnified, where the human-nature interface is most pronounced in large urban areas, and cities
are facing increased exposure to risks and hazards (UNISDR, 2017). This research is intended to
address that gap and provide insight into the phenomenon at the city level, while incorporating a
longitudinal approach.
The limited disaster crime knowledge and existing research gaps have practical
implications as well. Maximizing disaster crime knowledge will likely aid in disaster
preparedness and response efforts. Emergency managers, police departments, and fire
departments would benefit from a more nuanced understanding of how crime changes during
disasters, and what factors exacerbate or mitigate disaster impacts. Better prepared responders
could then ideally minimize instances and severity of victimization from disasters. Overall, this
research is intended to help address the problem of increased victimization and negative
consequences from disasters, stemming from (1) disaster crime (2) disaster myths, and (3)
research gaps related to disaster crime.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this quantitative correlational study is to examine the relationship
between number of days with a major weather event or weather-related disaster, and Index
Crimes for the same cities. The study addresses the problems listed above by regressing number
of days per year with a major weather event or disaster onto Index Crime rates in Texas’ largest
cities from 2000 through 2017. High school dropout rate, poverty rate, and unemployment rate
are used as proxies to provide insight into the role of Social Disorganization relative to disaster
crime within the ten cities. The findings add to the body of work that assists law enforcement and
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emergency managers better prepare for disasters, and eventually help the body of disaster crime
research to minimize victims of crime associated with disasters. Additionally, the study adds
some clarity to disaster myths and disaster realities, which then allows for a higher preparedness
level among the community and responders. Finally, the study provides further insight into the
role of Days with Disaster and crime, which particularly assists disaster-prone communities in
further understanding disaster crime. This study is significant to the fields of emergency
management and criminology, while also aligning with the author’s personal interests and
background.
Research Topic
This quantitative correlational study builds off the relatively limited existing disaster
crime research, and further explores the relationship between disasters and crime through
analysis of Index Crime rates in the ten most populous Texas cities. Additional consideration is
given to pre-existing Social Disorganization factors, which can contribute to crime rates. Several
overall goals, which align with the problems described above, will help shape the study.
Goals of the Study
The goals of the study are meant to address (1) the practical problems identified and (2)
the research gaps identified related to disaster crime and its study. The first and primary goal of
the study is aimed at the practical problems identified. The goal is to increase the limited
research related to specific types of criminal behavior during or after major weather events and
disasters. The topic receives somewhat limited attention from researchers (Parkinson, 2019;
Rubin & Rogers, 2019). A component of this goal is to help clarify disaster myths versus disaster
realities, allowing for better preparedness by the public and responders. The overall intended
outcome of the goal is to reduce the effects of victimization from crime associated with disasters
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and major weather events. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the practical problems,
the implications of those problems, and the components of the study goals intended to help
address those problems.
Figure 1. Practical Problems, Implications, and Study Goals.

The second overarching goal is multi-faceted and intended to address gaps in the research
related to crime surrounding major weather events and disasters. One aspect of the goal is to
increase knowledge related to a subject of ongoing debate among researchers regarding longterm crime rates surrounding disasters, and whether disasters should be considered criminogenic
(Prelog, 2016; Weil et al., 2019). Another part of the goal is to focus specifically on the number
of days with major weather events and disasters in relation to crime. Another construct of the
goal is to specifically address factors related to urban areas and specifically to major weather
events and weather-related disasters. The final component of the goal is to examine any impact
of Social Disorganization factors. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the research gaps,
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the implications of those gaps, and the components of the study goals intended to help fill those
gaps.
Figure 2. Research Gaps, Consequences, and Study Goals.

Significance of the Study
This research could have benefits related to (1) the practice of emergency management,
(2) criminological theory development, and (3) law enforcement and crime reduction efforts.
Potential Emergency Management Benefits
Frailing and Harper (2017) and Quarentelli (2006) have articulated an argument that
disasters only have consequences because of the involvement of society before, during, and after
disasters (Breetzke et al., 2018). If communities gain a better understanding of disasters’ impacts
on crime rates, or altered crime patterns, such knowledge would arguably allow the communities
to more readily prepare for disasters and recover quicker from them (Frailing & Harper, 2017).
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The findings might also dispel some potential disaster myths or clarify that some of the myths
may not be myths after all. Such clarification would allow emergency managers to focus
attention and resources on the real hazards instead of disaster myths. One could also argue that
these findings add to the body of evidence relative to criminological theory.
Potential Benefits to Development of Theory
This study also adds slightly to the body of evidence supporting Shaw and McKay’s
(1942) Social Disorganization Theory (Breetzke et al., 2018). The study provides further insight
into the role of Social Disorganization in explaining post-disaster crime rates as Frailing and
Harper (2017) suggested occurred in New Orleans after Katrina, and as Davila et al. (2005)
suggested occurred after two previous floods in Texas. The findings of this study also partially
inform a Unified Disaster Crime Theory, which is proposed later in the dissertation. Along with
the aforementioned benefits related to criminological theory, the study has law enforcement and
crime reduction benefits.
Potential Law Enforcement and Crime Reduction Benefits
This research provides some additional insight and an enhanced evidence base to aid in
decision making relative to policies and funding toward preemptive crime reduction measures.
Essentially, this study provides a better understanding of the impacts of crime during disasters,
thereby allowing for potentially more effective crime reduction strategies, particularly in
disaster-prone areas. This research also provides new information on trends relative to disasterrelated crime. The findings of this study could potentially be used by police agencies, if
necessary, to adjust current enforcement plans and procedures relative to disaster-related law
enforcement activities. Additionally, if police agencies are already conducting disaster
enforcement operations that align with the research findings, the research would provide police
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agencies with additional evidence base and additional justification for their practices and
procedures related to disaster crime. In addition to the practical benefits to emergency managers
and law enforcement personnel, and criminologists studying theory, this author finds the study
significant as a result of his life and career experiences.
Personal Motivation
This author has experienced Hurricane Harvey personally as a resident of the greater
Houston area, and professionally as a federal Law Enforcement Officer (LEO). As a resident of
the greater Houston area, this author evacuated his family to avoid Hurricane Harvey and, by the
grace of God, emerged with his family unharmed and experienced extremely limited property
damage. Additionally, as a federal LEO, during the months following Harvey, this author served
on a Hurricane Harvey Disaster Fraud Working Group, where he worked with several law
enforcement agencies to investigate allegations of disaster fraud after Harvey.
This author’s experience conducting disaster fraud investigations provided first-hand
exposure to the negative results of disaster crime, and the further victimization that occurs when
people commit crimes that are designed to prey upon the disorganization and public assistance
that comes after a disaster. Finally, having a law enforcement and emergency management
background combined with a graduate degree in emergency management, this author believes
this study aligns well with his research interests and professional experience, and the study
would provide a nexus to both the criminal justice and the homeland security components of the
Liberty University Doctor of Philosophy in Criminal Justice. Having discussed the research
topic, including background, and potential benefits, the focus will shift to the research questions
that frame the inquiry to help address the problems discussed above.
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Research Questions
Research Questions (RQ)s shape the direction of the inquiry. Below are the research
questions for the study:
RQ 1: Does number of days with major weather events or disasters significantly predict
Index Crime rates in the ten most populated cities in Texas?
RQ 2: Do Social Disorganization factors moderate the relationship between number of
days with major weather events or disasters, and Index Crime rates in the ten most
populated cities in Texas?
Definitions
1. Disaster - The term disaster is defined as “a collective stress in a community following
hazardous events in which community functioning is impaired” (Willett, 2019, p.139).
2. Disaster Recovery Period – According to FEMA (2016), the disaster recovery period is
not simply the time needed to return to pre-disaster circumstances. Instead, it is unique to
each community’s circumstances and priorities. Each community defines recovery
outcomes differently based on its circumstances, challenges, recovery vision, and
priorities. Some communities may emphasize economic recovery while other
communities might emphasize rebuilding of structures. As a result, the disaster recovery
period could last months, years, or decades.
3. Major weather event - Storms and other significant weather phenomena that have
sufficient intensity to cause loss of life, injuries, significant property damage, and/or
disruption to commerce; rare, unusual, weather phenomena that generate media attention,
such as snow flurries in South Florida or the San Diego coastal area; and other significant
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meteorological events, such as record maximum or minimum temperatures or
precipitation that occur in connection with another event (NOAA, 2020).
4. Disaster Frequency – Use of this term in this dissertation aligns with Prelog’s (2016) use
of the term, and it describes the number of disasters in an area during a particular year.
The definition above is provided to help clarify a distinction between ‘disaster frequency’
and ‘number of days with a major weather event or disaster’ as used in this study.
5. Number of Days with a Major Weather Event or Disaster – This phrase, as it is
operationalized in this study, is intended to reflect the proportion of a given year that is
destabilized by a disaster or major weather event. This study uses ‘Days with Disaster’
interchangeably with this term for brevity.
6. Disaster Crime - Although one might consider disaster crime to be limited to crimes that
are part of the disaster, such as Looting or violence during a disaster, this study will apply
a broader definition. For brevity, the term disaster crime is used to describe any crime
occurring during the general timeframe of a disaster or major weather event. The term
also includes crime that has the potential to change in nature or rate during the timeframe
of a disaster or major weather event and can include part of the recovery period of
disasters or major weather events (NOAA, 2020).
7. Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) Summary Reporting System (SRS) - According to
Pattavina et al. (2017), the UCR SRS is designed to provide data related to crimes and
arrests.
8. National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) – NIBRS is the system designed to
provide enhanced data related to crimes and arrests. NIBRS provides additional data
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beyond what the UCR SRS provides but is a relatively recent system (Pattavina et al.,
2017).
9. Index Crimes – The UCR program uses a Crime Index to summarize crime rates (Texas
Department of Public Safety [DPS], 2015). The crimes that are considered ‘Index
Crimes’ are Murder, Rape, Robbery, Aggravated Assault, Burglary, Larceny-Theft, Auto
Theft, and Arson. Murder, Rape, Robbery, Arson, and Aggravated Assault are considered
‘violent crimes,’ and the remaining crimes listed are considered ‘property crimes.’
Summary
Researchers are developing a criminology of disaster in hopes of understanding crime
surrounding disasters and perhaps one day helping to mitigate its negative effects on society
(Frailing & Harper, 2017; Prelog, 2016). In an effort to advance the study of disaster
criminology, this quantitative study examines Index Crime rates in relation to major weather
events and disasters. This dissertation helps to address the problem of gaps in the research related
to long-term relationships between crime rates and Days with Disaster, while considering the
role of Social Disorganization factors. These findings also provide information to assist law
enforcement and emergency managers better prepare for disasters, while also adding a point of
comparison to the existing body of work related to crime rates associated with previously
researched disasters. Having provided an overview of the research, the focus will shift to a
review of the relevant literature regarding disaster mythology, Social Disorganization Theory,
social order, and crime rates all within the context of disasters.
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
Overview
This chapter begins with an explanation of the steps taken to gather relevant research
articles, an introduction to the overall state of the research relative to disaster and crime, and
discussion of challenges specific to emergency management and disaster research. Next, the
chapter shifts to discussion on misconceptions of human behavior during disasters, known as
‘disaster myths’ (Nogami, 2018), and prosocial behavior during disasters. The discussion will
then give way to an analysis of Social Disorganization Theory within the context of disaster
crime. Next, the chapter discusses research exploring crime during disasters. Finally, the
summary section provides a final overview of the literature reviewed, with an eye toward the
gaps in the literature.
Literature Review Process
Several search terms and synonyms were used to conduct Internet searches as well as
various online library database searches to locate salient literature. The author sought to identify
the most recent peer-reviewed articles available relative to each section of the literature review,
and used those articles as a direct source of information on the topic, but also as a source to
locate additional articles on the topic. The process was then reversed to locate other articles that
referenced the initial article.
An ongoing tracking spreadsheet was also developed to assist in tracking and organizing
the articles. An effort was also made to locate any relevant dissertations. Although any identified
dissertations were not utilized for their research findings, focusing on the reference list assisted
in locating additional recent and relevant articles. Additionally, some article databases include a
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“similar articles” link, which lists other articles that could be relevant to the topic. This function
was used frequently to locate additional articles for review.
Once the names of prominent authors on the topic became familiar, they provided an
additional avenue to search for articles directly using the author’s name. Upon gathering and
reviewing many of the articles, one begins to understand the evolution of the research to date, the
questions yet to be answered, inconsistencies in the research, the primary authors who drove
progress, as well as how they began to interact with one another in written scholarly discourse.
Overall, the author implemented a deliberately formulated, consistent, and thorough informationgathering and article review process that aided in minimizing opportunities to overlook relevant
articles or research findings.
Attempts were made to rely heavily upon recent peer-reviewed publications, and
wherever possible, a recent peer-reviewed article was used as the source of information.
However, much of the foundational information, including theories, was initiated many years
ago, and some of the seminal works related to what are now known as disaster sociology
(Quarantelli, 2007) and disaster criminology (Frailing & Harper, 2017) were published in
textbooks instead of peer-reviewed journals. Disaster research could also be described as ‘event
driven,’ which creates ebbs and flows in publications, as articles are published in the years
following disasters. As a result, relatively large gaps in the timing of disaster research can be
observed. For example, several studies were published in the years following Hurricane Katrina,
but disaster research in the U.S. somewhat waned after a few years, until other disasters struck.
Additionally, other sources of information, such as government websites, are often the best
source material, particularly related to emergency management topics, government records, and
disaster information. However, such government documents are not published yearly. Thus,
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much of the seminal disaster research and disaster crime research and government data was
published more than five years ago.
Overarching Themes Regarding the State of the Literature
The study of disasters is an ever evolving and interdisciplinary endeavor that falls within
an overarching paradigm called disaster risk reduction (DRR) research (Staupe-Delgado, 2019).
Environmental science, urban planning, economics, psychology, biology, and many other fields
of study have a role to play in DRR research. One component of DRR relates to the secondary
risks and protective factors created by humans surrounding disasters. Disaster crime is one such
secondary risk stemming from disasters.
Disaster sociologists have long recognized the importance of studying criminal activity
associated with disasters (Prelog, 2016; Frailing & Harper, 2017). Eventually, criminologists
also added to the body of work (Frailing & Harper, 2017). By researching what is now becoming
known as disaster criminology, criminologists, sociologists, economists, and others are
attempting to better understand society’s reactions to disaster, particularly related to crime, in
hopes of gaining knowledge to help mitigate the negative impacts of disaster on society (Prelog,
2016; Frailing & Harper, 2017).
Upon review of the literature, it becomes apparent that research on the link between
crime and disaster is present within multiple research areas. This may be a result of so many
fields having a role in preparing and responding to disasters. That trend is apparently reflected in
the research as well. Relevant articles were located in journals related to economics, medicine,
gender and culture studies, human resources, criminology, interpersonal violence, emergency
management, geography, sociology, urban affairs, social work, healthcare, behavioral science,
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geoscience, cartography, political science, water, emergency medicine, social psychology, Asian
economics, earth science, security, and criminal justice.
Additional review of the references within the articles revealed a few consistent authors,
such as Frailing, Harper, Quarentelli, Breetzke, and Nogami. However, many of the other
references appear to be unique to a specific field, and less disaster crime oriented. One could
argue that this research diffusion across so many fields has the potential to create disjointed
research based on the differing priorities of each field of research. However, the perspectives
offered by researchers from various fields likely also benefits the body of work in that multiple
lenses are applied to the myriad problems associated with disasters and crime.
Another notable trend identified by the author is that several of the publications providing
empirical evidence that one would normally expect to see published in a peer-reviewed academic
journal are instead published as chapters in books. This is particularly true of some of the key
works from criminological researchers and some sociology researchers studying disaster. If
criminological researchers are aiming to continue taking a prominent place within the academic
discourse on disaster and crime, a focus on publishing in peer-reviewed journals could prove
beneficial. Additionally, disaster research presents several challenges that may be unique to
emergency management and disaster studies. Those challenges are likely limiting the number
and scope of emergency management related articles, including that of disaster crime.
Regardless of the lens a person applies, the need exists for a continued multi-disciplinary
research effort to broaden the body of work related to disasters and crime. Additional research
would be significant to emergency managers in their planning efforts and in perhaps clarifying
some disaster myths and realities. Additionally, depending upon the findings, law enforcement
personnel may also consider disaster crime research to be significant to their enforcement
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planning efforts. Victim assistance specialists and researchers might also find such research
useful since disasters have been connected with increased risk of interpersonal violence (Farmer
et al., 2018; Seddighi et al., 2019) as well as an increase to actual personal victimization,
interpersonal violence, and trauma (Gilmore et al., 2018; Yoshihama et al., 2019; Parkinson,
2019). Finally, criminologists might consider disaster crime to have relevance toward the further
development of criminological theory. Another theme identified in the literature is that several
unique challenges were found to be relevant to emergency management and disaster research.
Challenges to Emergency Management and Disaster Research
Often, social science researchers studying disaster face immediate logistical challenges,
due to the upheaval of the people and communities being studied (Grineski et al., 2019). Simply
locating people could provide a challenge since so many are displaced (SAMHSA, 2016; Taiole
et al., 2019). Researchers have also found it difficult to locate and secure research funding, given
the chaos of disaster situations combined with the need to collect data immediately (SAMHSA,
2016). Institutional Review Board approvals may also cause other delays in initiating field
research due to an increased likelihood of accessing vulnerable populations such as disaster
victims (SAMHSA, 2016).
Additionally, the unpredictable nature of disasters makes preparation and planning efforts
difficult and limits the ability to conduct pre/post research, causing much disaster research to be
cross-sectional (Grineski et al., 2019). Waters (2016) added that few studies collect baseline
data, resulting in a reliance on retrospective data, particularly when surveys or interviews are
involved. This reliance on retrospective data can cause a higher potential for error. Limiting data
to that which is collected after the disaster also limits the ability to detect the degree to which
disasters affect survivors (SAMHSA, 2016). Disaster and emergency management researchers
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must also avoid overgeneralization of findings, since the nature of disasters may cause findings
to be more dependent upon context and allow for a lower degree of generalization to only very
similar events and populations (SAMHSA, 2016).
Overall, disaster research faces unique challenges associated with the act of research,
which many people likely view as a low priority. De-prioritization of disaster research is
understandable given the timing, disorganization, upheaval, and limited resources associated
with disasters. Additionally, these challenges arise at a time when most people are probably
focused on what are viewed as first priority safety-related tasks. Indeed, researchers also face the
challenge of balancing the safety of disaster victims, the safety of the researchers, ethical
considerations related to disaster victims as a vulnerable population, and immediate needs of
survivors, with the need to gather information to hopefully reduce the impact of disasters on
future victims (SAMHSA, 2016).
Taioli et al. (2019) identified several barriers that were present specifically when trying to
conduct research related to Hurricane Harvey. Gaining permission to access disaster victims in
shelters was difficult. They found no clear process to gain permissions needed to conduct
research and no clear designation of a person who could authorize research in the affected area.
One might argue that some of the barriers experienced during Harvey likely stemmed from a fear
of further victimizing an already vulnerable population. This concern for further victimizing
already vulnerable populations was also listed as a general ethical challenge to disaster research
(SAMHSA, 2016).
Tailoi et al. (2019) also described challenges, including logistical issues such as flooded
roads limiting access, and communication issues due to downed phone lines. Additionally, the
necessary and appropriate prioritization of disaster victims’ safety and health needs slows
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research progress as well. However, they seemed to experience fewer barriers upon completion
of their follow up study six months after Harvey. The reduced barriers were possibly an
indication that disaster research overall faces fewer challenges as time passes after the disaster
hits. Regardless, disaster research could be described as ‘event driven,’ and dependent upon
disasters occurring in a manner that facilitates their study. The research challenges above might
also provide a sense of urgency for researchers who are probably eager to leverage any feasible
opportunity to study disasters and gain insight relative to disasters or disaster crime. Such
researchers must necessarily rely upon whatever new data become available for research. The
challenges above have likely stifled some disaster research efforts, which in turn has probably
allowed at least a few disaster myths to linger.
Disaster Myths
Nogami (2018) described some myths and misconceptions related to disasters. People
often think of disaster victims as masses of panicked people trampling one another to reach
safety. However, panic resulting in casualties is rare during disasters. Additionally, one might
think of disaster victims as helpless and overwhelmed. The reality is that a majority of lifesaving actions occurring after disasters are conducted by disaster victims, known as “zero
responders” (Nogami, 2018, p. 491). Another myth is that the assumed need for supplies at
disaster sites is actually incorrect, and donated supplies often surpass the needs of disaster
victims and cause new challenges such as staffing and storage space for the overage of supplies.
Additionally, according to Nogami (2018), Looting is considered rare during disasters,
and crime rates do not generally increase during disasters. Nogami (2018) also highlighted that
Looting and general crime could increase during disasters, but only when paired with Social
Disorganization factors such as socioeconomic disparity and unemployment. This assertion was
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based on Frailing and Harper’s (2017) findings. Although, if socioeconomic disparity and
unemployment are indeed considered to be related to increased crime after disasters (Frailing &
Harper, 2017; Nogami, 2018), one might ask how much of a “myth” can increased crime rates
after disaster actually be, particularly in low income, urban areas, which are likely present in
every major city in the United States.
Regardless of the topic of the disaster myth, they are certainly a matter of concern,
particularly when often believed by first responders (Nogami, 2018). Incorrect preconceived
notions among first responders could unintentionally result in improper actions, potentially
increasing the danger to disaster victims (Nogami, 2018). Disaster myths are an important
concern in emergency management, and one of the aforementioned disaster myths is arguably
dispelled later in Chapter five of this dissertation. The disaster myth related to the prominence of
Looting is also of particular interest, since this dissertation examines Burglaries, which could be
similarly viewed as a proxy for Looting, as operationalized by Frailing and Harper (2017).
Disaster myths during a particular event can also be perpetuated or dispelled through the
appropriate use of the news media.
The news media can be effectively used as a mechanism to disseminate necessary
information related to an impending disaster (Frailing & Harper, 2017). The media can also
provide important updates related to an ongoing disaster, such as keeping survivors informed or
communicating the need for supplies. Without a reliable messaging system, survivors and
concerned family members or citizens may often rely upon rumors as a source of information.
However, the media can also cause harm through misinformation, particularly when it serves as
an amplification mechanism for disaster myths or false rumors.
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The media can initiate or perpetuate incorrect rumors, which could alter survivors’ or
responders’ perceptions of perceived risks. Frailing and Harper (2017) mentioned some of the
news media’s outrageous descriptions of atrocities that were allegedly happening during
Hurricane Katrina, which exaggerated the danger. Tierney et al. (2007) reported similar
exaggerations of lawlessness during other disasters. Such heightened fears could result in an
increased likelihood of violence intended as self-defense. Likewise, one might imagine the media
under-reporting lawlessness as part of a political agenda or narrative. Such underreporting of
lawlessness might misinform people and leave them ill prepared for disaster crime.
Negative disaster myths and rumors are particularly concerning, since prosocial behavior
occurs quite frequently during and after disasters (Nogami, 2018). The disagreement regarding
the nature and extent of prosocial behavior and antisocial behavior surrounding disasters, as well
as disagreement on disaster myths, should be reason enough to continue research related to
disasters if only to offer perspective on what responders and disaster victims will face. The
aforementioned challenges and myths, which likely hinder and limit disaster and emergency
management research and proper disaster response, could also be directly causing or, at a
minimum, facilitating an increased level of Social Disorganization, which is discussed next as
the theoretical framework that supports this research.
Theoretical Framework
Researchers have used several theories to explain disaster crime. Frailing and Harper
(2017) summarized past researcher’s efforts to use Social Disorganization Theory, Rational
Choice Theory, or General Strain Theory to explain disaster crime. Other researchers have used
Cohen and Felson’s (1979) Routine Activities (RA) Theory (Breetzke et al., 2018; Prelog, 2016).
Although the theories above all seem to have some merit in explaining disaster crime, Social

36
Disorganization Theory was chosen for this study due to the nature of the inquiry and the use of
aggregate city-level data.
Social Disorganization Theory
Thomas and Znaniecki (1918) established the concept of Social Disorganization when
they observed social institutions become upset wherein existing social norms and rules have a
decreased influence on community members. This disorganization occurs when the existing
social structure and norms in the community fail to meet the needs of the changing social system.
An example of this occurred when a combination of political and economic policies would
eventually cause middle-class black families to move away from socially organized
neighborhoods and into neighborhoods that reflected the Social Disorganization factors
described below (Frailing & Harper, 2017). Thus, socially isolated and disorganized
neighborhoods formed, many with destructive value systems facilitating criminal activity
(Frailing & Harper, 2017).
Burgess (1925), with an eye toward Chicago, posited that an industrial zone forms the
central nucleus of cities, with an outer layer of residential zones. The closest residential zone is
the transitional zone, which is populated by new inhabitants, positioning themselves to work in
the central industrial zone. The next layers of zones were thought to be inhabited by longer-term
residents, with more stability than the transition zone. Shaw and McKay (1942) would later add
to the research, particularly in transitional zones, immediately outside the industrial zones.
Shaw and McKay (1942) believed that transitional zones were typified by high residential
turnover, poverty, and ethnic heterogeneity. The aforementioned factors were thought to explain
the high crime rates in these areas, regardless of who populated the zone. Essentially, Shaw and
McKay (1942) thought that the three identified factors created disorganization within families,
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educational systems, and religious institutions, by reducing parents’ control over children. The
lack of control allowed youths to gain increased exposure to an older criminal element in the
zone, which resulted in increased crime. Sampson’s (1986) family disruption aspects such as
death, divorce, and incarceration would later be considered the fourth factor of Social
Disorganization Theory.
According to Kubrin and Wo (2016), socially disorganized communities have the
following characteristics: (1) Lack of internal consensus on norms and values, (2) lack of bond
among residents, and (3) lack of integration, with little interaction occurring regularly. These
neighborhoods lack the informal social control or collective community intervention toward
problems. In essence, socially disorganized neighborhoods are filled with strangers, who do not
see themselves as any form of community, and as a result, they do not work together to solve
problems in the neighborhood, and do not have any expectations of one another, or more
importantly, responsibilities toward one another.
Racial heterogeneity is often thought to impact social control and even informal social
control within a neighborhood (Kubrin, 2000; Kubrin & Wo, 2016). It is thought that the
heterogeneity will reduce interaction among groups, as well as joint efforts to solve
neighborhood problems (Kubrin, 2000; Kubrin & Wo, 2016). A primary factor is less
communication among dissimilar racial groups (Kubrin, 2000). Social Disorganization leads to
variations in the commitment of individuals to group standards, and as a result, weakens
expectations of compliance with community norms as systems of social control (Kubrin, 2000;
Kubrin & Wo, 2016). The costs for deviation from the neighborhood norm are reduced, and in
short, people are simply less likely to look out for one another in a community if fewer people in
the neighborhood are of the same race (Kubrin, 2000; Kubrin & Wo, 2016).
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Taken together, Social Disorganization researchers have identified several factors that are
thought to reflect higher degrees of Social Disorganization. School dropout rates represent
disruptions to family and educational systems (Shaw & McKay, 1942). Other authors found
socioeconomic factors such as poverty and unemployment to be key Social Disorganization
factors related to increased crime (Frailing & Harper, 2017; Nogami, 2018). However, if Social
Disorganization factors are associated with increased crime, it seems reasonable to hypothesize
that decreased Social Disorganization factors or increased social order factors would be
associated with decreased crime.
Researchers such as Pratt and Cullen (2005) have also tested whether Social
Disorganization factors influence crime and found that Social Disorganization factors may be
mediated by social integration from social networks to lessen crime. Other researchers identified
social order factors that can mitigate the negative impacts of Social Disorganization (Zahran et
al., 2009). He and Messner (2020) discussed some of the social order factors that were found to
offset those negative impacts. The frequency of residents’ interactions among neighbors
positively affected informal control in urban neighborhoods in Shanghai. Lower levels of
poverty and migration were found to increase informal control and be associated with reduced
crime. Higher education levels were also found to be associated with lower property crime rates.
Overall, communities that demonstrate high levels of social capital such as nuclear families,
dialect homogeneity, and social cohesion through neighborhood committees also experienced
enhanced informal social control.
Social Disorganization and Crime
Kubrin (2000) studied crime in neighborhoods in Seattle, Washington, during 1980 and
again in 1990 to determine if changes in racial heterogeneity in a neighborhood were associated
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with crime rate changes from 1980 to 1990. She compared U.S. Census data to Seattle Police
Department crime report statistics for neighborhoods, using two sets of multivariate analysis
using an ordinary least squares regression and found that racial heterogeneity is a strong
predictor of violent crime in a neighborhood while controlling for socioeconomic and
demographic factors.
Kubrin (2000) also found that the inclusion of racial heterogeneity into models reduced
the perceived importance of the percentage of black people in the community as a predictor of
violent crime in the community. In short, it appeared that the percentage of black people in a
community could somewhat predict levels of violent crime in the community until Kubrin (2000)
inserted racial heterogeneity into the model. She found that changes in racial heterogeneity were
positively associated with changes in the violent crime rate. Although Kubrin (2000) would
likely disagree with her research being used as an argument for racial segregation, she would
probably agree that racial heterogeneity is one of several Social Disorganization factors that
combine to create socially disorganized communities that have less informal social control and
more crime.
Lowenkamp et al. (2003) would later replicate Sampson and Groves (1989) study, which
found support for the Theory that Social Disorganization factors transmit community structural
characteristics on crime rates. Lowenkamp et al. (2003) determined that their findings identified
a consistent underlying empirical pattern. Other research found that Social Disorganization
factors are some of the strongest predictors of crime (Prelog, 2016). Preira et al. (2017) found
that Social Disorganization factors characterized homicide in Brazil but cautioned that specific
contexts in Brazil may not be generalizable to other countries. Quick et al. (2018) found that
Robbery and violent crimes were found to be positively associated with Social Disorganization

40
factors of deprivation, instability, and ethnic heterogeneity. A few studies have also incorporated
Social Disorganization factors into the analysis of disaster crime (Frailing & Harper, 2017;
Prelog, 2016; Spencer, 2017).
Social Disorganization, Disaster, and Crime
One might expect, at least temporarily, that post-disaster settings, particularly when
multitudes of people are displaced, would replicate or worsen the type of racial heterogeneity,
and lack of connection or consistent norms seen in disorganized communities. Indeed, some
researchers view disasters as another factor adding to disorganization, particularly related to low
socioeconomic status and instability, which can impact crime (Davila et al., 2005; Zahran, et al.,
2009). Certainly, death and family disruption occur during disasters, which were key
components of Social Disorganization Theory from its inception (Sampson, 1986). Disasters can
disrupt unity and collective efficacy in the community, reducing community self-policing, and
increasing antisocial behavior (Prelog, 2016). The research on violence and crime against
displaced families at shelters may bolster that assertion. Nguyen (2019) found increased rates of
post-disaster violence against women and girls in the Philippines, particularly when Social
Disorganization was prominent prior to the disaster. Seddeghi et al. (2019) found a similar trend
in a systematic review of almost 700 papers.
Residential instability, including that found in disaster, can cause substance use to
increase as well as reduced social support networks (Prelog, 2016), which could increase crime.
Varano et al. (2010) also found evidence that Hurricane Katrina crime patterns were affected by
the displacement of evacuees to other areas such as Houston, San Antonio, and Phoenix. They
found that several factors associated with disaster were connected to Social Disorganization
Theory, including economic disadvantage, separation from social networks, and other stressors.
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Thus, one could argue that disasters, by their nature, can have a mirroring effect to that of
disorganized communities.
The findings relative to Social Disorganization and disaster are particularly troubling
when combined with other authors’ findings that disasters have been known to have
disproportionately adverse impacts on communities that exhibit characteristics that are
commonly associated with Social Disorganization (Ogie & Prahdan, 2019). Indeed, the impact of
a disaster is most pronounced on the most vulnerable communities, which often share
demographics, social support, and educational characteristics with socially disorganized
communities (Ogie & Prahdan, 2019). That increased vulnerability in socially disorganized
communities is often referred to as ‘social vulnerability’ (Sun et al., 2017; Frigerio et al. 2018;
Aksha et al. 2019).
It follows that the increased vulnerability of socially disorganized communities to
disasters could also contribute to crime rates during and after disasters, while disrupting social
unity and weakening the public response to crime (Spencer, 2017). Frailing and Harper’s (2017)
findings related to the importance of Social Disorganization Theory in disaster crime are
relevant. They determined that the combination of socioeconomic stability and the RA Theory
factor of Guardianship kept the Burglary rate increases low in New Orleans after the 1947 major
weather event. In a different study, Frailing and Harper (2017) found that the New Orleans
socioeconomic factors, including high inequality rates, account for a significant increase in
Burglaries after Hurricane Katrina. Shoji’s (2018) results would seem to reinforce the role of
ethnic or cultural heterogeneity as a potentially criminogenic Social Disorganization factor. Shoji
(2018) found that religiously fractionalized households were more likely to be victims of crime
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after disasters and suggested that disaster relief funds should be directed toward highly socially,
economically, or religiously divided communities.
However, other researchers found an opposite trend, that disasters bring people together,
thereby reducing Social Disorganization, at least temporarily (Kuroishi & Sawada, 2019;
Whitehouse et al., 2017). However, Leitner et al. (2011) found declines in crime rates in Orleans
Parish after Hurricane Katrina, which eventually increased to post-weather levels, and even
higher in some instances. The eventual increase to a level above pre-Katrina timeframes,
particularly in violent crimes, would later be attributed to changes in drug markets throughout
New Orleans after Katrina (Frailing et al., 2015). However, little if any research currently exists
exploring the role of Social Disorganization with an emphasis on urban areas, particularly in the
state of Texas.
Potential Increases to Social Order During and After Disasters
Disasters, although overwhelmingly negative, may also have results that could be
beneficial to society (Waters, 2016). Disasters identify a community’s weaknesses and protective
factors, which, if appropriately researched, can result in new information that benefits society
and strengthens communities (Waters, 2016). Another example of the positive results of disasters
comes in the form of prosocial behavior and bonding among community members and
volunteers after disasters, which is discussed below.
One might argue that prosocial activities and Social Disorganization are at play
simultaneously during disasters (Prelog, 2016). However, no database exists to store data on
prosocial acts even in the best of times, much less during disasters. Despite the lack of constant
prosocial data collection, observers might be surprised that the research on the existence of
prosocial behaviors surrounding disasters is robust and formidable (Frailing & Harper, 2017).
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Among the first researchers to delve into the topic, Dynes (1970) asserted that disasters,
in some ways, enhance social order, wherein norms emerge supporting prosocial behavior.
Drabek (1986) later indicated that disaster victims are rational after disasters, and assist other
victims, despite certainly having been afraid for their own safety. Lemieux (2014) found that
social altruism was a factor in increased mutual aid and community solidarity during a crisis, and
he indicated that those two factors resulted in a decrease in crime he observed in Canada.
Citizens are often the first to arrive on the scene during disasters, can play a significant
role in disaster response and recovery, and are often present well into the recovery process
(Whittaker et al., 2015). Whittaker et al. (2015) found that informal volunteers donate time,
resources, and knowledge during disasters. Emergent and extending volunteers play a role in
disaster response and recovery, as do an ever-increasing number of digital volunteers who use
technology to aid in communications (Whittaker et al., 2015). Calo-Blanko et al. (2017) found
that earthquakes in Chile had a positive effect on social cohesion. They also found that social
cohesion erodes in disorganized areas.
Maki et al. (2019) conducted multiple cross-sectional surveys before and after the 2010
earthquake in Chile. They found increased levels of national identity, disaster-related helping,
and motivation to help. They also found that respondents who were closer to the epicenter of the
earthquake showed the highest levels of national identity and participation in recovery.
However, the question remains regarding why people would exhibit such prosocial behavior
during a time when one might assume people would focus on self-preservation. Maki et al.’s
(2019) findings could reflect a unification response after a disaster, which one might argue falls
in line with some of the below research exploring why people exhibit prosocial behaviors during
and after disasters.
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Reasons for Prosocial Behavior During Disasters
Vardy and Atkinson (2019) suggested that ever-present threats during disasters have
possibly shaped the human tendency toward prosocial behavior as humans have adapted to
disasters. They found that the type and severity of a person’s experiences effected the direction
and nature of the person’s prosocial behavior. By conducting game experiments on 164 people,
they found that individual disaster experiences influence cooperative attitudes. After a disaster,
participants showed less prosocial motivation and a more parochial focus related to sharing
resources. Higher levels of property damage were also found to predict a decrease in prosocial
leanings and increased participants’ preference toward their own groups. However, exposure to
others in need also predicted increased prosocial behaviors both inside and outside one’s own
group.
Kuroishi & Sawada (2019) also addressed the reason why people seem to be motivated
toward prosocial behavior after disasters by conducting a study involving damage assessments
and laboratory experiments during 2014 and 2018. They noticed an increase in money donated
toward victims of disaster, which supports a model for pure altruism during the aftermath of a
disaster. However, they also found that the altruism subsides as time passes, possibly eventually
stabilizing at a level commensurate with non-disaster altruism.
Whitehouse et al. (2017) developed a mathematical model showing that training people
to cooperate in a shared experience can facilitate a group-oriented prioritization to take place.
The study found that people who share difficult life circumstances such as disasters experience
what they called identity fusion, which can result in self-sacrifice and prioritization of the wellbeing of the group, even to one’s own detriment. Military veterans, law enforcement, and team
athletes would likely agree with the premise that shared hardships create a bond among people.

45
This identity fusion phenomenon could arguably be partially responsible for the prosocial
behavior observed during disasters, and a sense of community that lasts well after the disaster is
over.
Other researchers also identified instances of prosocial activity during disasters.
Whitehouse et al. (2017) found that sharing painful experiences produces a sense of oneness or
camaraderie, which in turn can motivate self-sacrifice. In addition, Vardy and Atkinson (2019)
found that observing the suffering of other people can stem prosocial behavior depending on the
circumstances. Lemieux (2014) also found that, based on donation funds, altruism was exhibited
to an increased degree by people who were closer to the disaster.
Overall, the consistent examples of disaster altruism could reflect a type of therapeutic
community or identity fusion process underway during disasters. Such a process could be
mitigating the negative outcomes that seem to result from the destructive value systems and
inconsistent group norms and expectations that are found in disorganized settings. Essentially, a
galvanizing process could be occurring since otherwise disorganized communities now have a
common challenge, which could be aligning group norms and value systems, if only temporarily.
However, identity fusion does not necessarily translate into less crime.
Crime During and After Disasters
Recent research into crime after natural disasters has produced mixed results. Initially,
disaster researchers emphasized that widespread post-disaster Looting could be considered a
disaster myth (Quarantelli & Dynes, 1970; Wenger & Friedman, 1986). However, as additional
research came to light, the myth of widespread Looting shifted to become understood as a reality
(Brown, 2012), which could be more or less prevalent depending upon factors such as a highly
disadvantaged population, a culture tolerant to stealing, such as gangs, and corruption or
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inefficiency by the local police force (Quarantelli, 2008). Others continued to report evidence of
overwhelming amounts of Looting during hurricane Katrina (Munasinghe, 2007).
In building toward this increasingly nuanced understanding of disaster crime, Frailing
and Harper (2007) reported a 15% increase in burglaries after hurricane Betsy in 1965 and an
almost 403% increase in the Burglary rate during hurricane Katrina in 2005. North Carolina also
saw increases in Burglary and domestic violence after hurricane Hugo (LeBeau, 2001). Other
researchers found an increase in sexual assault during disasters in the U.S. (Thornton & Voigt
2007) and internationally (True, 2016). Other researchers found positive relationships between
human trafficking and increased disaster severity (Gurung & Clark, 2018). Houston has also
experienced sufficient natural disasters in recent years to warrant some special attention from
researchers. Leitner and Helbich (2011) found increases in burglaries and motor vehicle theft in
Houston related to hurricane Rita in 2005. Other researchers used a difference in difference
(DID) analysis and identified increases in Murder, Robbery, and motor vehicle theft in Houston
as a result of the in-flux of hurricane Katrina evacuees from New Orleans (Hussey et al., 2011).
Other research into disaster crime in Houston would find that Burglary increased by more than
270% during Hurricane Harvey, while other crimes decreased (Augusto, 2020).
Blakeslee and Fishman (2018) studied heatwaves and drought in India, finding that both
have a strong impact on all types of crimes, with property crimes reflecting a higher impact than
violent crimes. Frailing and Harper (2010) used Burglary as a proxy for Looting and determined
that Burglary rates during the months surrounding Katrina were significantly higher than the
other two major hurricanes to strike New Orleans. They attributed the difference to Social
Disorganization factors. Other researchers found decreases in crime associated with disasters.
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Herber (2014) found that overall crime rates decreased after three disasters struck Japan
in 2011. Bretzke and Andresen (2018) used Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and
determined that crime decreased since a major earthquake in Canterbury, New Zealand. In a
different study with other co-authors, Bretzke et al. (2018) found that, although overall crime
decreased after a major earthquake in a different part of New Zealand, domestic violence
increased. They also found similar temporal crime patterns for all crime types prior to and after
the earthquake. They also noted that crime increased in the majority of neighborhoods in the
town, indicating a shift in crime toward residential areas. This research serves as a reminder of
the importance of conducting research at varying levels of analysis. Temporary movement of
crime to a nearby neighborhood requires different distinct solutions that might not be considered
if disaster crime research only focused on large scale research. Leitner et al. (2011) found that
crime rates remained stable or decline in regions accepting disaster evacuees from areas hit by
hurricanes. However, several other studies discussed below had mixed findings.
Leitner and Helbich (2011) analyzed the impacts of Rita and Katrina by collecting crime
data before, during, and after each hurricane. Crime data were collected before, during, and after
the landfall of both hurricanes and spatio-temporal and local geographically weighted regression
models were used. They found that Katrina had no impact on crime in Houston, and Rita led to
significant short term increases in Burglary rates and Auto Theft rates. The analysis also located
a cluster of burglaries in northeastern Houston, presumably as a result of evacuees leaving homes
unattended. Increases in burglaries after Rita had a positive relationship with poverty levels,
percent black, and distance to the nearest police station.
Zahnow et al. (2017) determined that a flood in Brisbane was associated with significant
property crime increases, but also found that the increases were amplified by property crime
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increases in affluent, non-flooded neighborhoods. Damage in flooded neighborhoods was
thought to displace instances of property crimes toward more attractive targets. Other researchers
studied fraud associated with disasters (Aguirre & Lane, 2019; Stratton, 2018).
Stratton (2018) reported widespread complaints of fraud, specific to areas hit by disasters.
Aguirre and Lane (2019) found that fraud and other crimes occur during the early phase of
disasters, and high-dollar crime increases as time passes. This might be expected based on the
level of re-stabilization necessary to commit complex white-collar crime. Murder, drugs, and
human trafficking were also considered in relation to disasters.
Frailing et al. (2015) found that New Orleans's Murder rates increased after Katrina and
they attributed the increase to changing drug market patterns after the disaster, among other
factors. Their research appeared to be at least partially informed by findings of Bennet et al.’s
(2011) research, which determined that New Orleans drug markets contained socially bonded
customers and distributors, but after Katrina, violence increased within a freelance market with
limited social bonds. Gurung and Clark (2018) later used generalized estimation equations on a
unique cross-section, time-series dataset of more than 150 countries, for a 10-year period, and
identified a consistent positive link between natural disasters and the likelihood of human
trafficking. Other societal factors are also at play during disaster crime.
Weil et al. (2019) found that social networks that are open to outsiders are associated
with lower levels of violent crime, but internally focused, less open social networks were
associated with higher levels of violent crime. These findings hint at Social Disorganization as a
disaster crime theory since lack of interaction and non-inclusiveness among people in the
community is a component of a disorganized neighborhood. Other researchers explored disaster
crime at a more macro level. One large-scale study covered all counties in Florida and 34 major
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natural disasters during a 14-year period and identified decreases in Index Crimes and increases
in domestic violence (Zahran et al., 2009). Leitner and Helbich (2011) would later study disaster
crime across Louisiana after Hurricane Katrina and identified minimal change in some areas and
declines in other parts of the state. Prelog (2016) used longitudinal multi-level modeling to
examine every county in the U.S. and identified a positive relationship between disaster impacts
and property crimes. Spencer (2017) studied hurricanes in Florida from 1976 to 2012 and
determined that crime increased in counties that were directly struck by hurricanes, but
neighboring counties experienced a decrease in crime. Both Spencer (2017) and Prelog (2016)
used the county as the unit of analysis.
Spencer and Stobl (2019) also found that hurricanes increased crime by 35%, and more
damaging storms have greater crime increases. However, Spencer and Stobl (2019) found that
the crime rate changes only occur near the hurricane. They found that Aggravated Assault,
break-ins, and shootings increased during hurricanes, but Murders, Rapes, and Robberies
declined. These findings are somewhat similar to Augusto’s (2020) study of Hurricane Harvey
indicating that, during the storm, burglaries increased by 287%, but thefts decreased 54%,
robberies decreased 48%, and Auto Thefts decreased 32%.
Natural disasters often result in fatalities and injuries. Disasters have also been known to
cause disease, mental health consequences, and resource scarcities, which also cause social
conflicts (Xu et al., 2016) and may play a role in the predominance of interpersonal violence
during disasters. Several authors have explored secondary forms of victimization stemming from
disaster, such as interpersonal violence.
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Interpersonal Violence or Victimization from Disasters
Yoshihama et al. (2019) studied sexual assault in Japan after an earthquake and found
that offenders exploited helplessness in victims and withheld resources necessary for survival in
exchange for sexual demands. Weitzman and Behrmann (2016) combined two groups of
demographic and health survey data prior to and after the 2010 Haiti earthquake and observed
spatial variations. They found that exposure to the earthquake increased the probability of
physical and sexual interpersonal violence. Campbell et al. (2016) found slightly increased rates
of interpersonal violence and abuse experienced by females after disaster.
First et al. (2017) reviewed multiple studies which, taken together, indicated that disasters
can increase the prevalence and severity of interpersonal violence, and have cascading negative
effects on disaster recovery for victimized women. Resnick et al. (2017) found that exposure to
prior disaster and exposure to interpersonal violence were associated with post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD) in disaster survivors. Sohrabizadeh (2016) found enough evidence of
interpersonal violence against female disaster survivors that she suggested integration of
interpersonal violence-related victim services measures into disaster medicine plans and public
health reforms. Farmer et al. (2018) found that the fear of interpersonal violence at public
disaster shelters was stronger than fears of sanitation issues or structural integrity within the
shelters.
Sloand (2017) also reported numerous allegations of physical, psychological, or sexual
abuse against adolescent females who were displaced by natural disasters. Harvey (2017) also
went so far as to assert that social policy serves as a secondary form of violence toward disaster
survivors by abandoning attempts to rebuild their communities. Seddighi et al. (2019) added that
natural disasters create an increased risk of child abuse due to disruption of preventative
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mechanisms and weaker protection mechanisms for children. This is particularly concerning for
women and children since Gilmore et al. (2018) suggested that women and children who
experienced previous interpersonal violence were more likely than other groups to exhibit
symptoms of PTSD after a natural disaster.
Parkinson (2019) conducted qualitative research, which determined that domestic
violence increased subsequent to major brushfires in Australia. Nguyen (2019) found that
women and girls in the Philippines faced an increased threat of violence due to a combination of
disaster and social inequalities. Indeed, one can see themes of Social Disorganization woven
throughout the findings described above, and it might prove difficult to argue that Social
Disorganization factors are not at least remotely linked to disaster crime rates and interpersonal
violence. After discussing much of the disaster crime research findings, the next section of this
literature review will discuss some recent articles that provide support for the dissertation’s
method and constructs.
Research Designs Found in the Literature
Although several studies have used a similar research design to study disaster crime, none
of them answer the specific questions being addressed herein or studied crime at the city level of
analysis, or recently in Texas. Overall, Prelog’s (2016) study provides a proven example of a
similar research design being effectively used to study this topic. Prelog (2016) studied Index
Crimes using a multi-level model, which was necessary due to the nested nature of counties
within states. Prelog (2016) also used historical data from government sources as proxies for
Social Disorganization variables and social order variables. He used Census data as measures of
racial heterogeneity and inequality, and he used non-profit data as a proxy to represent social
order.
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This study is well positioned to parallel Prelog’s (2016) established procedures, while
pivoting toward Texas cities and unexplored components of Social Disorganization in disaster,
such as dropout rates, poverty, and unemployment. Prelog’s (2016) study also gave limited
attention to Disaster Frequency as part of a larger formula to measure disaster impacts. Like
Prelog’s (2016) study, this research uses government data sources, but this study focuses on days
with major weather event or disaster in relation to crime. Spencer (2017) provided another
similar research design to study crime and disaster. She focused on the Saffir-Simpson Scale to
measure direct effects of hurricanes and used unemployment and income as control variables.
Spencer (2017) also retrieved her data from government data sources. Taken together, these
studies provide the bulk of the framework for this research design.
Operationalization of Variables in Past Research
Disaster Variables. Disaster Frequency was used by Prelog (2016) to simply reflect the
number of disasters that struck an area during a time period. This study uses Days with Disaster
instead of Disaster Frequency as a variable. A distinction is made because Days with Disaster
provides a more precise representation of how many days in a given year contained a major
weather event or disaster. For example, in the case of Hurricane Harvey, Disaster Frequency, as
used by the above researchers, would likely reflect only a single disaster. However, the use of
‘Days with Disaster’ would account for the total number of days with a major event occurring
related to Hurricane Harvey. This method allows for a more precise reflection of the proportion
of a year that is impacted by disasters or major weather events.
Disaster Consequences were also operationalized by Prelog (2016) using direct deaths,
direct injuries, crop damage, and property damage combined. This study combines direct deaths,
direct injuries, and property damage, and leaves out crop damage, given the urban areas being
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studied. This allows for a composite representation of the most consequential impacts of
disasters and major weather events in urban areas.
Social Disorganization Variables. Weil et al. (2019) also used government data from the
Census Bureau to identify areas of concentrated disadvantage and applied those data to their
survey results to study violent crime during disasters. Campbell et al. (2016) used a comparative
descriptive correlational design to study violence against female disaster survivors. Although that
study was based on a self-report survey, the correlational design used is arguably less rigorous
than the regressions conducted in this study. Gurung and Clark (2018) used yearly time series
data of crime rates in several countries across a decade in order to identify a positive association
between disaster and human trafficking. Gurung and Clark’s (2018) study is also an important
comparison point since this study relies upon almost two decades of yearly time series data to
identify associations between disasters and crime.
This dissertation also follows the precedent set by other researchers, who relied upon
government data as proxies to represent various Social Disorganization variables. Pereira et al.
(2017) used Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics data as proxies for Social
Disorganization factors and found positive relationships between homicides in Brazil and levels
of inequality, rented houses, and quantity of people. Quick et al. (2018) used British government
Census data on poverty levels, residential relocations, and the British Index of ethnic
heterogeneity, and found that Robbery and violent crimes were positively associated with Social
Disorganization factors of deprivation, residential instability, and ethnic heterogeneity. The
articles above are instructive on ways in which other researchers have operationalized Social
Disorganization variables.
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Population Density Variable. Population Density has been used relatively frequently as a
variable in criminological research. Battin and Crowl (2017) used historical government data to
study Population Density in relation to crime. Cabrera-Barona et al. (2019) also used historical
government data to incorporate Population Density into regression models and found that crime
was positively correlated with Population Density. Jung et al. (2020) also used government
historical data to establish Population Density as a control variable in their regression models and
found that assaults in Gagnum, South Korea were positively related to ambient Population
Density.
Overall, previous researchers have laid the groundwork for future studies to emulate in
order to operationalize key variables related to Disaster, Social Disorganization, and Population
Density. Although this dissertation can be said to parallel and advance some parts of the
processes used by the above researchers, this study does not replicate any of the above studies.
Additionally, this study fills some gaps in the above literature by studying cities and emphasizing
Days with Disaster during a 17-year time period, which is longer than most of the studies above.
Summary
Although historical research (Barton, 1969; Dynes, 1970; Drabek, 1986), and more recent
research (Lemieux, 2014; Nogami, 2018) indicate that disasters have definite prosocial effects on
behavior, in many ways bringing out the best in people, researchers have also found increased
crime rates associated with disasters (Leitner & Helbich, 2011; Frailing et al., 2015; Prelog,
2016; Spencer, 2017; Zahnow et al., 2017; Weil et al., 2019). In addition, researchers found
changes in the spatial patterns of crime, during the timeframe surrounding disasters (Leitner &
Helbich, 2011; Zhanow et al., 2017; Breetzke & Andresen, 2018; Breetzke et al., 2018).
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The research picture that is unfolding seems to indicate that disasters are associated with
both increases in crime and decreases in crime (Spencer, 2017), as well as changes to the spatial
patterns of crime in the affected area (Zahnow, et al., 2017). In addition, one relatively consistent
research finding is that disaster myths have a way of permeating peoples’ perceptions of disasters
as well as the news media’s portrait of disasters. These disaster myths have the potential to create
incorrect assumptions related to the amount and severity of antisocial acts and violence
surrounding disasters (Quarentelli, 2007; Lemieux, 2014; Nogami, 2018).
With such widely varied disaster crime research findings, it becomes more important that
continued research can eventually paint a more accurate picture of disaster crime and overcome
disaster myths that, if acted upon, could potentially lead to a heightened fear response by disaster
responders or misallocation of disaster resources and law enforcement resources. Thus, disaster
criminology research becomes even more important to overcoming disaster myths and arming
lawmakers, emergency managers, and law enforcement with the information to best prepare for
disasters.
Based on the varied findings from different types of studies, one might argue that the true
picture of crime during disasters cannot develop fully without (1) the application of several
research methods applied to the same event for a focused analysis of a specific phenomenon, and
(2) to a macro level of data to identify general relationships between disasters and crime.
However, researcher specialty and access to data limit researchers’ abilities to understand any
phenomenon from every perspective. These limitations increase the importance of the use of
multiple types of research to paint a picture. Attempts to rely upon a single study seem to result
in the appearance of inconsistent findings across the disaster crime literature. Perhaps a more
systematic approach to building the body of work is in order wherein researchers attempt to
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study disaster at all levels of analysis. Perhaps the inquiry should begin at the largest level, such
as Prelog’s (2016) focus on all counties in the U.S. It follows that such research could be
narrowed to cover several large cities, and this research is intended to fill that need. Finally, the
systematic research progression would apply to the smallest level, such as the zip code or police
precinct. Until the various units of analysis are all covered, disaster crime research will likely
continue to appear inconsistent. Other factors may promote the appearance of inconsistency in
disaster crime research findings as well.
Although researchers have stockpiled seemingly undeniable evidence of prosocial
behavior surrounding disasters (Frailing & Harper, 2017), disaster behavior is not a zero-sum
game wherein a rise in prosocial behavior means an equivalent decrease in antisocial behavior.
Overall, the seemingly contradictory research covered in this chapter may simply be an
indication that disasters cause simultaneous increases in prosocial and antisocial behaviors as
different people struggle to adjust to the fear and uncertainty that comes after disasters. Perhaps
the disorganization and uncertainty cause some people to react pro-socially and others to react
antisocially. This study is also intended to build the needed understanding of the role that Social
Disorganization plays in changes to Index Crime rates surrounding major weather events and
disasters.
Through a review of the literature, this chapter also established that Social
Disorganization factors, which are associated with higher crime rates (Lowenkamp et al., 2003;
Sampson & Groves, 1989), are thought by some to be created or exacerbated by disasters
(Frailing et al., 2017; Prelog, 2016). It was further established that rates of certain crimes are
often found to increase during timeframes surrounding disasters, and Social Disorganization
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factors have, at times, been found to be a factor in the crime rate increase (Frailing & Harper,
2017).
This chapter also established that, despite a growing research-backed body of knowledge
related to disasters, one can see that disaster myths are still being differentiated from disaster
realities. These myths paint a sometimes-disturbing picture of human behavior during or after
disasters (Frailing & Harper, 2017), even among first responders. These myths could potentially
cause improper, fear-based actions among disaster victims, volunteers, and first responders.
Researchers should thus aim their sights toward the overall association between crime
and disaster if only to help clarify the reality of the nature of disaster crime and minimize the
impact of disaster myths during future disasters. Such research, when compared to past studies,
might also help establish some idea of the generalizability of disaster research, which is a key
challenge facing disaster research (SAMHSA, 2016). Given the relatively inconsistent empirical
research relative to crime rates associated with disasters, particularly while controlling for Social
Disorganization factors often found in urban areas, this study will aim to begin filling several
gaps in the disaster crime literature.
Despite many communities facing repeated weather events and disasters, no research was
found studying the relationship between days with a major storm event or disaster and crime.
Such research would add to the body of work by filling a gap in the literature relative to the role
of recurring disasters and major weather events and crime. Additionally, although some of the
authors above conducted long term studies (Spencer, 2017; Prelog, 2016), none focus on Texas.
Additionally, little, if any, research specifically focuses on the city as the unit of analysis, despite
the high populations of large urban areas as key nexus points between humans and nature
(UNISDR, 2017) and their common status as socially vulnerable to heightened Disaster
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Consequences (Aksha et al., 2019). In addition, although some studies have incorporated Social
Disorganization factors into their studies (Prelog, 2016; Harper & Frailing, 2017), further
questions remain concerning the role of specific Social Disorganization factors in disaster crime.
This study aims to address those gaps by using a longitudinal design to study urban areas while
incorporating Days with Disaster, Disaster Consequences, Population Density, and Social
Disorganization factors. The next chapter will thus explain the proposed research methodology
intended to answer the research questions in this study.
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CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHOD
Overview
This chapter provides details on the research method selected to answer the research
questions listed in Chapter One. Research has shown mixed results regarding crime rates
surrounding disasters (Prelog, 2016; Spencer, 2017). Additionally, at the time of this draft, no
research was located studying number of days with a major weather event or disaster as a
correlate of crime. Thus, the below research questions are designed to identify any associations
between number of days with a major weather event or disaster and crime in urban areas in
Texas. Social Disorganization factors will also be included in the analysis.
RQ 1
RQ 1: Does number of days with major weather events or disasters significantly predict
Index Crime rates in the ten most populated cities in Texas?
RQ 1 Hypotheses
Ho1: Number of days with major weather events/disasters does not significantly predict
Robbery rates.
Ha1: Number of days with major weather events/disasters significantly predicts Robbery
rates.
Ho2: Number of days with major weather events/disasters does not significantly predict
Murder rates.
Ha2: Number of days with major weather events/disasters significantly predicts Murder
rates.
Ho3: Number of days with major weather events/disasters does not significantly predict
Rape rates.
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Ha3: Number of days with major weather events/disasters significantly predicts Rape
rates.
Ho4: Number of days with major weather events/disasters does not significantly predict
assault rates.
Ha4: Number of days with major weather events/disasters significantly predicts assault
rates.
Ho5: Number of days with major weather events/disasters does not significantly predict
Burglary rates.
Ha5: Number of days with major weather events/disasters significantly predicts Burglary
rates.
Ho6: Number of days with major weather events/disasters does not significantly predict
Larceny rates.
Ha6: Number of days with major weather events/disasters significantly predicts Larceny
rates.
Ho7: Number of days with major weather events/disasters does not significantly predict
Auto Theft rates.
Ha7: Number of days with major weather events/disasters significantly predicts Auto
Theft rates.
RQ 2
RQ 2: Do Social Disorganization factors moderate the relationship between number of
days with major weather events or disasters, and Index Crime rates in the ten most
populated cities in Texas?
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RQ 2 Hypotheses
Ho8: Social Disorganization factors do not moderate the relationship between number of
days with major weather events/disasters and Robbery rates.
Ha8: Social Disorganization factors do moderate the relationship between number of days
with major weather events/disasters and Robbery rates.
Ho9: Social Disorganization factors do not moderate the relationship between number of
days with major weather events/disasters and Murder rates.
Ha9: Social Disorganization factors do moderate the relationship between number of days
with major weather events/disasters and Murder rates.
Ho10: Social Disorganization factors do not moderate the relationship between number of
days with major weather events/disasters and Rape rates.
Ha10: Social Disorganization factors do moderate the relationship between number of
days with major weather events/disasters and Rape rates.
Ho11: Social Disorganization factors do not moderate the relationship between number of
days with major weather events/disasters and assault rates.
Ha11: Social Disorganization factors do moderate the relationship between number of
days with major weather events/disasters and assault rates.
Ho12: Social Disorganization factors do not moderate the relationship between number of
days with major weather events/disasters and Burglary rates.
Ha12: Social Disorganization factors do moderate the relationship between number of
days with major weather events/disasters and Burglary rates.
Ho13: Social Disorganization factors do not moderate the relationship between number of
days with major weather events/disasters and Larceny rates.
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Ha13: Social Disorganization factors do moderate the relationship between number of
days with major weather events/disasters and Larceny rates.
Ho14: Social Disorganization factors do not moderate the relationship between number of
days with major weather events/disasters and Auto Theft rates.
Ha14: Social Disorganization factors do moderate the relationship between number of
days with major weather events/disasters and Auto Theft rates.
Scope of the Study
Given the contemptible nature of crimes against disaster survivors, this research seeks to
facilitate further understanding of crime associated with disasters. The study analyzes overall
Index Crime, violent Index Crime, and property Index Crime as well as Social Disorganization
factors that play a role. All Index Crimes except Arson were analyzed for the time period from
January 1, 2000, through December 31, 2017. City boundaries are used as the grouping
parameter since the sources of data can be applied at that level. Texas DPS data was used to
collect yearly Index Crime rates for the ten most populous cities in Texas. The National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Weather Events Database was used for data on the
number of days per year with a major weather event or disaster. Government data was used to
incorporate the potential Social Disorganization factors such as unemployment rates, poverty,
and school dropouts to identify if such factors have a mediating, moderating, or confounding
effect on crime rates, similar to the format used by Frailing and Harper (2017).
Limitations
The study is limited to the data collected by Texas DPS, NOAA, the U.S. Department of
Labor, and the Texas Education Agency. Thus, the level of detail of the data reported is limited
by the agencies collecting data. Various rates were measured in yearly increments based on
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parameters of the databases. The study is further limited by the timeframes of data collected
since the most recent data are relevant, but agencies need time to collect and report recent data.
The timeframe of the study is further limited by the transition from UCR SRS to NIBRS.
After relying upon the UCR SRS for several decades, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
redesigned a system in an effort to record additional detail beyond what the UCR SRS provided
(Pattavina et al., 2017). The final result of the enhancement effort was the NIBRS. However, the
transition from SRS to NIBRS has been a lengthy process, and Texas DPS still reports both SRS
and NIBRS data, thus allowing for studies that extend back several years (Pattavina et al., 2017).
The UCR SRS data was used instead of the more detailed NIBRS data because many of the
agencies being studied did not make the transition to NIBRS until recently. A comparison of
several years of SRS data to several years of NIBRS data would skew the results and is illadvised (HPD, 2019).
In addition, since the study focuses on most Index Crimes within urban areas, the
findings may not be generalizable to other types of crime in rural areas. The findings may also
not be generalizable to other countries. As with other criminological research and emergency
management research, there is likely no way to account for all the possible confounding
variables in the real world. As a result, the findings should be taken as additional information to
add to a larger body of work, which may evolve in a different direction over the years.
Another limitation of this study relates to the extent to which the results can be
interpreted. Inappropriate extrapolation of aggregate data can lead to ecological fallacy (Pollett et
al., 2015), which is essentially the application of group characteristics at the individual level. As
a result, the interpretation of the findings from this study are limited in that they cannot be
assumed to apply to any one city or any one part of a city.
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Delimitations
Delimitations of the proposed study are determined by the author based on judgment and
research experience. The researcher chose the listed problems as a starting point, reflective of the
current state of disaster crime research. Additionally, the identified problems were within reach,
using available crime data.
The purpose of the proposed quantitative correlational study is to examine the
relationship between Index Crime rates and number of days with major weather events and
disasters in the ten most populous cities in Texas from 2000 through 2017. The author limited
the study to that which can be conducted using available crime data, major weather event data,
and Social Disorganization data, with commonly accepted research methods. The study avoids
analyzing data that is not directly relevant to the research questions. The study does not analyze
crimes other than Index Crimes in the cities being studied, or crime rates outside of the 17-year
window. Additionally, only major weather events and weather-related disasters were studied.
Thus, other types of disasters, such as earthquakes, are not weather-related, and are not included
in the study.
The study does not analyze data from suburban police agencies that border the larger
cities. Additionally, no campus police department data were used, even if a campus is inside the
city limits. Attempts to include data from smaller, outskirt communities and campuses would
likely create significant inconsistencies in how and when crime data is collected, organized, and
made available. This is particularly relevant given the staffing limitations of smaller agencies
compared to large metropolitan police departments. Additionally, the data being used relies upon
arrest records of only the most serious offenses.
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Another delimitation of the study relates to the time measurement used. Much of the
disaster crime literature focuses on the impacts of individual disasters and relatively short
periods of time. While the study of the narrow windows of time surrounding a disaster is an
important part of the picture, this research is intended to uncover long-term, broad relationships
between crime and number of days with weather events and disasters in major urban areas in
Texas. As a result, this study also does not provide insight into county-level crime trends.
Assumptions
It is assumed that the data reported by government sources are a reasonably accurate
reflection of the intended information. It is also assumed, based on past research (Spencer, 2017;
Zahnow, et al., 2017), that crime rates and patterns change during disasters, although the nature,
timing, and extent of the change is part of this study. An additional assumption is that Intellectus
Statistics (IS) software and Microsoft Excel are all functioning reliably to maintain information
and calculate various formulas as intended.
Research Design and Rationale
Methodology
This research is a quantitative exploratory correlational study using existing data
collected and reported by the agencies below. The RQs were addressed by regressing number of
days with major weather events or disasters (Days with Disaster) against Index Crime rates,
while incorporating Social Disorganization factors, Population Density, and Disaster
Consequences into the models.
Variables
All variables are continuous. The dependent variables (DV)s are specific yearly Index
Crime rates in each city, collected from the Texas DPS Crime in Texas Online database (2020).
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The crimes included are Murder, Rape, Robbery, Aggravated Assault, Burglary, Larceny, and
Auto Theft. Arson is not included in the analysis because initial review of the data revealed few
instances of Arson. The independent variable (IV) is Days with Disaster, and it consists of the
number of days per year with a major weather event or disaster reported by the NOAA Weather
Events Database for each city. This manner of operationalizing the variable also parallels Social
Disorganization Theory, since the Theory emphasizes the importance of factors in an
environment and systems within the environment that people experience. Establishing a variable
reflecting the number of days with disasters or major weather events also parallels that emphasis
on the environment, since it reflects the proportion of a year the city was exposed to a major
weather event or disaster and all the social and environmental changes and stressors that come
with that disaster exposure.
A Social Disorganization composite variable, a Disaster Consequences composite
variable, and a Population Density variable serve as control variables (CV)s. The two composite
CVs are mean composites, where each construct of the variable is averaged along with the others
for a total mean score representing the composite score for each year. Yearly unemployment
rates, school dropout rates, and poverty rates are the socioeconomic factors combined into a
mean composite variable and used as the Social Disorganization proxy for each city (Frailing &
Harper, 2017; Nogami, 2015; Nogami, 2018). Yearly unemployment rates and yearly poverty
rates were used from the Department of Labor (DOL) database. Each city’s school dropout rates
serve as a proxy for disruption to family and educational systems described by Shaw & McKay
(1942). Dropout rates for each city were collected from the Texas Education Agency (TEA)
Public Education Information Management System (PEIMS) (TEA, 2020). Yearly dropout rates
from 8th grade to 12th grade were used from the TEA. The Disaster Consequences composite
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variable is comprised of direct deaths and direct injuries reported by the NOAA Weather Events
Database (2020). The yearly Population Density variable for each city was calculated using
yearly population counts collected from the Texas DPS Crime in Texas Online database (2020)
and publicly available data on the total square miles of each city. Table 1 outlines the IVs, CVs,
and DVs. Each of the Index Crimes was analyzed as a different variable.
Table 1. Study Variables
Independent Variable
Days with Disaster
Yearly number of
days with a major
weather event or
disaster in each city.

Control Variables
Social Disorganization Composite
Variable
Yearly unemployment rates
Yearly dropout rates
Yearly poverty rates

Dependent Variables
Yearly Index Crime rates other
than Arson

Disaster Consequences Composite
Variable
Yearly direct deaths from
disaster
Yearly direct injuries from
disaster
Population Density Variable
Yearly Population Density for
Each City
Note. Each variable is measured per year for each of the following cities: Arlington, Austin,
Dallas, Corpus Christi, El Paso, Fort Worth, Houston, Laredo, Plano, and San Antonio.
Population
Field (2018) defined population as the set of units to which the findings are to be
generalized. Although often thought of as a group of people, the term ‘population’ is used in
statistics to describe a group, and it can include people, events, or outcomes (Banerjee &
Chaudhury, 2011). The population of the study is deemed to be crimes in Texas cities. Members
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of the population are a result of a combination of offenders’ individual actions, laws in place at
the time, and officer discretion and decision making. As a result, the size of the population was
beyond the control of the author.
Sample and Sampling Procedures
Field (2018) defined ‘sample’ as a smaller collection of units that are representative of
the larger population under study and Banerjee and Chaudhury (2011) similarly described the
term as any part of a defined population. The sample for this study includes all Index Crimes,
disaster and major weather event totals, disaster and major weather event casualty totals, and
Social Disorganization factor totals in the listed cities from 2000 through 2017. Regardless of the
source of the data, all complete data relevant to each research question and hypothesis was used
for analysis. Thus, the sampling groups were all the relevant data for each city.
The U.S. Census Bureau (USCB) population estimates for 2000, and 2010 through 2019
were used to identify the ten most populous cities in Texas (USCB, 2013; 2020), and the data
indicate that the 10 most populous cities in Texas remained the same throughout the time-period
of this study. Urban areas in Texas, as opposed to another state, or multiple states, were chosen
because they represent large urban areas in the U.S. Three of the cities fall within the top 10 most
populous cities in the U.S. (NLC, 2020), six of the 20 most populous cities (NLC, 2020), and the
cities are spread across a large portion of the landmass of the continental U.S. No other single
state has more representation within the list of the 20 most populous cities in the U.S. This helps
achieve data reporting consistency. Texas cities were also chosen because of the author’s
familiarity with the state, and several of the cities’ exposures to various major weather events
and disasters during the time period.
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Index Crimes other than Arson are included in the study since the use of these crimes will
facilitate future comparisons with existing research. Previous studies such as Frailing and Harper
(2017) used the Index Crime of Burglary as a proxy for Looting, and other Index Crimes have
been studied by other researchers (Seddighi et al., 2019). Additionally, Index Crimes are often
thought of as more serious crimes, and that status will likely help avoid any impacts of reduced
reporting and enforcement due to prioritization of life-saving activities and officer discretion.
The study covers yearly data from 2000 through 2017 in an effort to capture a large pool
of data while including time frames with and without major weather events and disasters. The
crime data sampling was limited to the Texas DPS crime data related to total yearly reports
provided for each city. Data for the IVs and CVs are yearly data associated with the relevant city
for that year.
Data Collection Process
All the needed data are available to the public on each respective agency’s public-facing
website. Index Crime data were collected from the Texas DPS Crime in Texas Online database.
The Texas DPS database was chosen over the FBI UCR database because the Texas DPS
database is the original source housing the same data that are later provided to the FBI UCR
system. DOL and TEA provide Social Disorganization data through their websites. Additionally,
public data for each city’s square mileage was combined with Texas DPS data to calculate
Population Density. The Days with Disaster data came from the NOAA database mentioned
above.
Data Analysis Plan
Data for each city were converted into the ratio per 100,000 residents for uniformity. IS
software was used to conduct the analysis. Multiple linear regression analysis was used to
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answer RQ 1 and the Baron and Kenny (1986) method of moderation analysis was used to
answer RQ 2. Multiple linear regressions were used to analyze relationships between the sets of
continuous IVs, continuous CVs, and continuous DVs (Field, 2018), and to answer the RQs and
determine if the IVs and CVs predict the DVs. Additionally, power analysis for a multiple
regression with four predictors was conducted in G*Power to determine a sufficient sample size
using an alpha of 0.05, a power of 0.80, and a medium effect size (f2 = 0.15) (Faul et al., 2013).
Based on the aforementioned assumptions, the desired sample size of 85 is well below the
sample size of this study (n = 180).
Bias was addressed by (1) testing for outliers and (2) testing for assumptions associated
with multiple linear regressions (Field, 2018). The assumptions of normality of residuals,
homoscedasticity of residuals, absence of multicollinearity, and lack of outliers were assessed.
The normality of residuals assumption implies that the residuals of the regression model are
normally distributed around the mean. The normality of residuals was assessed using a Q-Q
scatterplot of the residuals and a Lilliefors-Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (Field, 2018; Bates et al.,
2015; DeCarlo, 1997). The homoscedasticity assumption requires that no underlying relationship
exists among the residuals and the fitted values. A Breusch-Pagan test was used to assess
homoscedasticity (Field, 2018; Bates et al., 2015; Osborne & Walters, 2002).
The third assumption is that errors are independent, also known as an absence of
multicollinearity. The absence of multicollinearity implies that the predictor variables are not
highly correlated with one another. Multicollinearity was assessed using variance inflation
factors (VIF). VIF values higher than 10 suggest that multicollinearity could be present (Menard,
2009). The final assumption is the lack of outliers. This assumption is determined as any
observation that has a studentized residual (Field, 2018; Stevens, 2009) exceeding the .999
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quantile of a t-distribution, with the degrees of freedom being n-1, where n is the sample size.
Violations of regression assumptions were addressed using log transformations, which is a
common remediation measure used by researchers to meet the assumptions of a regression (Ford,
2018; UCLA, 2021).
Additionally, since time series data were used, the Durbin Watson test was used with a
critical values table (Notre Dame, n.d.) to test for statistically significant serial autocorrelation or
independent errors. Another form of potential bias unique to this type of dataset is aggregation
bias, also known as Simpson’s paradox (Martin & Legault, 2016), wherein the researcher
observes a reversal of the overall data trend at the disaggregated level (Pollett et al., 2015). The
potential for aggregation bias was addressed in this study by incorporating visual analysis of the
data at a disaggregated level, to look for any patterns that could indicate within-individual
variation in the data (Martin & Legault, 2016; Pollett et al., 2015). Additionally, since the
potential for aggregation bias cannot be completely negated, inferences made from the findings
reflect an increased level of caution to avoid the ecological fallacy that the overall findings
necessarily apply directly to any one city in the study.
Multiple Linear Regressions
Standard multiple linear regressions were used as described by Field (2018). The
standard method enters all independent variables (predictors) simultaneously into the model.
Variables were evaluated by the level of unique predictability they added to the prediction of the
dependent variable. The F-test was used to assess whether the set of independent variables
collectively predicts the dependent variable. R-squared was used as the multiple correlation
coefficient of determination and will be used to determine how much of the variance in the
dependent variable is attributed to the independent variables. The t-test was used to determine
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the significance of each predictor, and beta coefficients were used to determine the magnitude of
prediction for each independent variable. For significant predictors, every 1% increase in the
predictor, the dependent variable will increase or decrease by the magnitude of the
unstandardized beta coefficient, also represented as a percentage (UCLA, 2021).
Moderation
Moderators effect the direction or strength of the relationship between an IV and a DV
(Baron & Kenny, 1986). Baron and Kenny’s (1986) approach to moderation through regression
analysis was conducted using IS software, to determine if a third variable moderates the
relationship between the IV and the DV. Two conditions must be met for moderation to be
supported. First, the IV must significantly predict the DV. A linear regression model was used to
determine if there is a relationship between the IV and the DV. If the results of the linear
regression are significant, the first condition is met.
According to Baron and Kenny (1986), the second condition is that the model with the
interactions between the IV and the moderator must explain significantly more variance than the
model without the interaction. A hierarchical linear regression was conducted using IS software
to assess if the second condition is met. In the first block of the regression, the IV and moderator
were entered in. This examined how much variance is explained by just moderator and
independent variable. In the second block, the interaction of moderator and IV were entered in. If
the full model reveals that the interaction term of moderator and IV is a significant predictor of
DV, the second condition is met. The second condition does not require that the IV or the
moderator be significant in the interaction model. If both conditions are met, then moderation is
supported.
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Threats to Validity
Any research using archival agency data relies upon multiple levels of reporting, leaving
multiple opportunities for threats to validity through human error. Government officials report
information using reports or documents. The relevant data are collected within an agency system.
The data are then provided to sources such as the state of Texas DPS. Each step of the process
provides an opportunity for error. Additionally, one might argue that a higher likelihood of data
collection error would occur during disasters because of the challenges associated with such a
chaotic environment.
Finally, research has shown that officers might re-calibrate their application of officer
discretion during disasters, to determine how to handle police actions (Augusto, 2020). In short,
offenses that would normally result in an arrest may become a lower priority when compared to
life-threatening situations common in disasters. If so, it follows that arrest statistics would be
under representative of the amount of disaster crime actually occurring. It also follows that a
higher potential for mistakes or unreported violations, particularly related to minor offenses,
would create decreased internal validity before the data were even collected by the agency.
Ethical Concerns
The author foresaw no ethical concerns relative to the study. No contact with humans
occurred. Additionally, the author did not have access to names or other identifying information
or specific addresses for any of the victims, subjects, witnesses, or responding officers associated
with the data. As a result, many of the ethical concerns associated with research did not present
problems. Additionally, factors related to recruiting, instrumentation, and sampling were not
pertinent to the study. The Liberty University Institutional Review Board authorization number
for this study is FY20-21-569.
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Summary
This study is a quantitative correlational, longitudinal study, relying upon archival data
maintained by government agencies. The study analyzes (1) Index Crime rates other than Arson,
in the ten most populous Texas cities from 2000 through 2017 and (2) the relationship between
crime rates and Days with Disaster. The study controls for Population Density and Disaster
Consequences in each city. Additionally, to build upon Social Disorganization Theory, Social
Disorganization factors are incorporated into the analysis.
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS
Overview
This chapter summarizes the results of the data analysis conducted to answer the two RQs
for this study. Multiple regression analyses and moderation analyses were conducted to analyze
the relationship between Days with Disaster and specific Index Crimes in the 10 largest cities in
Texas. Table 2 lists the summary statistics for all the variables in the study. The table reports
summary statistics for the number of crimes reported per 100,000 people, per year. Summary
statistics for Population Density, Days with Disaster, Disaster Consequences, and Social
Disorganization reflect the yearly data for each variable, using the measurement process
described in Chapter 3.
Table 2. Summary Statistics for all Variables.
Variable

M
Murder
6.57
Rape
45.10
Robbery
198.45
Burglary
913.10
Assault
367.99
Larceny
3456.57
Auto Theft
445.79
Social Disorganization 8.12
Disaster Consequences 0.43
Population Density
2976.88
17.33
Days with Disaster

SD
4.47
17.01
153.84
408.92
144.60
1142.92
303.71
2.41
1.50
1051.85
7.92

n
180
180
180
180
180
180
180
180
180
180
180

SEM
0.33
1.27
11.47
30.48
10.78
85.19
22.64
0.18
0.11
78.40
0.59

Min
0.37
8.68
33.87
188.33
68.29
820.71
65.22
2.30
0.00
1126.40
1.00

Max
20.62
87.72
685.28
1882.29
726.07
5695.47
1600.98
13.70
13.56
8873.43
36.00

Mode
3.80
31.45
110.07
1029.09
454.90
4914.47
478.76
8.57
0.00
2072.30
18.00

Mdn
5.48
42.18
148.66
936.60
351.77
3503.85
409.11
8.15
0.05
2868.06
17.00

RQ 1: Does Number of Days with Major Weather Events or Disasters Significantly Predict
Index Crime Rates in the Ten Most Populated Cities in Texas?
Overall, the findings reflect that Days with Disaster significantly predicted Robbery,
Murder, Rape, Burglary, and Auto Theft. Days with Disaster did not significantly predict
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Larceny or Assault. Additionally, Social Disorganization and Population Density were often
found to predict crime in several of the models.
Ha1: Days with Disaster Predicts Robbery
Assumptions
A linear regression analysis was conducted to determine if Days with Disaster
significantly predicted Robbery, while including Population Density, Social Disorganization, and
Disaster Consequences in the model. All variables were log transformed, as recommended by
Field (2018) when using variables measured over time, to meet the assumptions of the multiple
regression. Normality of residuals was measured by a Lilliefors-Kolmogorov-Smirnov test,
which was not significant, indicating that the normality assumption was met (D = 0.05, p = .384).
Homoscedasticity was evaluated using a Breusch-Pagan test, which was not significant,
indicating that the homoscedasticity assumption was met (p = .061). VIFs were calculated to
detect the presence of multicollinearity between predictors. All predictors in the regression
model have Variance Inflation Factors (VIF)s between 1.09 and 1.20, which is well below the
allowable VIF upper limit of 10 (Menard, 2009), indicating that the multicollinearity assumption
was met. To assess the presence of outliers, studentized residuals were calculated, and absolute
values were plotted against observation numbers (Field, 2018; Pituch & Stevens, 2015).
Additionally, there were no outliers, and a Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelation among
residuals was not significant (DW = 1.99, p = .484), suggesting there was little to no
autocorrelation among the residuals.
Results
The results of the linear regression model were significant, F(4,175) = 10.86, p < .001, R2
= 0.20, indicating that approximately 20% of the variance in Robbery is explainable by Days
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with Disaster, Population Density, and Social Disorganization. Days with Disaster significantly
predicted Robbery, B = 0.40, t(175) = 4.33, p < .001. This indicates that on average, a 1%
increase of Days with Disaster will increase the value of Robbery by .40%. As a result, the null
hypothesis is rejected. Population Density significantly predicted Robbery, B = 0.39, t(175) =
2.41, p = .017, which indicates that, on average, a 1% increase of Population Density will
increase the value of Robbery by .39%. Social Disorganization significantly predicted Robbery,
B = 0.86, t(175) = 5.39, p < .001, indicating, on average, a 1% increase of Social Disorganization
will increase the value of Robbery by .86%. Disaster Consequences did not significantly predict
Robbery, B = 0.08, t(175) = 0.68, p = .499. Table 3 summarizes the results of the regression
model.
Table 3. Results for Linear Regression with Days with Disaster, Social Disorganization,
Population Density, and Disaster Consequences predicting Robbery.
Variable
(Intercept)
Days with Disaster
Population Density
SD
Disaster Consequences

B
-0.90
0.40
0.39
0.86
0.08

SE
1.40
0.09
0.16
0.16
0.12

95% CI
[-3.66, 1.87]
[0.22, 0.59]
[0.07, 0.70]
[0.54, 1.17]
[-0.15, 0.32]

β
0.00
0.32
0.17
0.40
0.05

t
-0.64
4.33
2.41
5.39
0.68

p
.523
< .001
.017
< .001
.499

Note. Results: F(4,175) = 10.86, p < .001, R2 = 0.20
Ha2: Days with Disaster Predicts Murder
Assumptions
A linear regression analysis was conducted using log-transformed variables, to determine
if Days with Disaster significantly predicted Murder, while incorporating Population Density,
Social Disorganization, and Disaster Consequences into the model. The data met all regression
assumptions except lack of outliers. Studentized residuals revealed two outliers, which were
found to be legitimate data points. Further analysis with the outliers trimmed using the Winsor
method (Vijendra & Shivani, 2014) did not significantly change the results, so the outliers were
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left in the data. The Lilliefors-Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicated that the normality assumption
was met (D = 0.05, p = .262). The Breusch-Pagan test indicated that the homoscedasticity
assumption was met (p = .887). All predictors in the regression model have VIFs between 1.09
and 1.20, which is well below the allowable VIF upper limit of 10 (Menard, 2009), indicating
that the multicollinearity assumption was met. A Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelation among
residuals was not significant (DW = 1.95, p = .372), suggesting there was little to no
autocorrelation among the residuals.
Results
The results of the linear regression model were significant, F(4,175) = 10.17, p < .001, R2
= 0.19, indicating that approximately 19% of the variance in Murder is explainable by Population
Density, Social Disorganization, and Days with Disaster. Days with Disaster significantly
predicted Murder, B = 0.30, t(175) = 3.01, p = .003, which indicates that, on average, a 1%
increase in Days with Disaster will increase the value of Murder by 0.30%. As a result, the null
hypothesis is rejected. Population Density significantly predicted Murder, B = 0.35, t(175) =
2.02, p = .045, indicating that, on average, a 1% increase of Population Density will increase the
value of Murder by 0.35%. Social Disorganization significantly predicted Murder, B = 1.01,
t(175) = 5.96, p < .001, which indicates that, on average, a 1% increase in Social Disorganization
will increase the value of Murder by 1.01%. Disaster Consequences did not significantly predict
Murder, B = 0.15, t(175) = 1.17, p = .242. Table 4 summarizes the results of the regression
model.
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Table 4. Results for Linear Regression with Population Density, Social Disorganization, Days
with Disaster, and Disaster Consequences predicting Murder.
Variable
(Intercept)
Days with Disaster
Population Density
Social Disorganization
Disaster Consequences

B
-4.06
0.30
0.35
1.01
0.15

SE
1.50
0.10
0.17
0.17
0.13

95% CI
[-7.03, -1.09]
[0.10, 0.50]
[0.01, 0.69]
[0.68, 1.35]
[-0.10, 0.40]

β
0.00
0.23
0.14
0.44
0.08

t
-2.70
3.01
2.02
5.96
1.17

p
.008
.003
.045
< .001
.242

Note. Results: F(4,175) = 10.17, p < .001, R2 = 0.19
Ha3: Days with Disaster Predicts Rape
Assumptions
A linear regression analysis was conducted using log-transformed variables, to determine
if Days with Disaster significantly predicted Rape, while including Population Density, Social
Disorganization, and Disaster Consequences in the model. The data met all regression
assumptions except lack of outliers and homoscedasticity. Studentized residuals revealed one
outlier, which was found to be a legitimate data point. Further analysis with the outlier trimmed
using the Winsor method (Vijendra & Shivani, 2014) did not significantly change the results, so
the outlier was left in the data. The Lilliefors-Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicated that the
normality assumption was met (D = 0.04, p = .808). All predictors in the regression model have
VIFs between 1.09 and 1.20, which is well below the allowable VIF upper limit of 10 (Menard,
2009), indicating that the multicollinearity assumption was met. A Durbin-Watson test for
autocorrelation among residuals was not significant (DW = 1.84, p = .144), suggesting there was
little to no autocorrelation among the residuals. The Breusch-Pagan test indicated that the
homoscedasticity assumption was violated (p = .001), so a regression with robust standard errors
was conducted (Cribari-Neto & Lima, 2014) using the homoscedasticity consistent (HC3)
method recommended by Mansournia et al. (2020).
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Results
The results of the linear regression model were significant, F(4,175) = 7.35, p < .001, R2
= 0.14, indicating that approximately 14% of the variance in Rape is explainable by Days with
Disaster, Population Density, and Social Disorganization. Days with Disaster significantly
predicted Rape, B = 0.18, t(175) = 3.61, p < .001. This indicates that on average, a 1% increase
in Days with Disaster will increase the value of Rape by 0.18%. As a result, the null hypothesis
is rejected. Population Density significantly predicted Rape, B = -0.23, t(175) = -1.99, p = .048.
This indicates that on average, a 1% increase in Population Density will decrease the value of
Rape by 0.23%. Social Disorganization significantly predicted Rape, B = 0.31, t(175) = 2.33, p <
.001, which indicates that, on average, a 1% increase in Social Disorganization will increase the
value of Rape by 0.31%. Disaster Consequences did not significantly predict Rape, B = 0.04,
t(175) = 0.66, p = .513. Table 5 summarizes the results of the regression model.
Table 5. Results for Linear Regression with Days with Disaster, Population Density, Disaster
Consequences, and Social Disorganization predicting Rape.
Variable
(Intercept)
Days with Disaster
Population Density
Disaster Consequences
Social Disorganization

B

Robust SE

95% CI

β

t

p

4.39
0.18
-0.23
0.04
0.31

1.027
0.05
0.11
0.67
0.31

[2.37, 6.45]
[0.08, 0.28]
[-0.45, -0.02]
[-0.09, 0.18]
[0.05, 0.571]

0.00
0.27
-0.18
0.05
0.26

4.28
3.61
-1.99
0.66
2.33

< .001
< .001
.048
.513
.021

Note. Results: F(4,175) = 7.35, p < .001, R2 = 0.14
Ha4: Days with Disaster Predicts Burglary
Assumptions
A linear regression analysis was conducted using log-transformed variables, to determine
if Days with Disaster significantly predicted Burglary, while including Population Density,
Social Disorganization, and Disaster Consequences in the model. The data met all regression
assumptions except the Lilliefors-Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicated that the normality
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assumption was violated (D = 0.05, p < .001). However, the Central Limits Theorem indicates
that means will be approximately normally distributed in a sufficiently large sample (n > 30)
(LaMorte, 2016), so the violation of normality likely carries limited impact on this analysis,
given the size of the sample (n=180). The modified Breusch-Pagan was used to adjust for nonnormality of the residuals, and the test indicated that the homoscedasticity assumption was met
(p = .318). All predictors in the regression model have VIFs between 1.09 and 1.20, which is
well below the allowable VIF upper limit of 10 (Menard, 2009), indicating that the
multicollinearity assumption was met. Additionally, there were no outliers and a Durbin-Watson
test for autocorrelation among residuals was not significant (DW = 1.85, p = .150), suggesting
there was little to no autocorrelation among the residuals.
Results
The results of the linear regression model were significant, F(4,175) = 5.75, p < .001, R2
= 0.12, indicating that approximately 12% of the variance in Burglary is explainable by Days
with Disaster and Social Disorganization. Days with Disaster significantly predicted Burglary, B
= 0.28, t(175) = 3.82, p < .001, indicating that, on average, a 1% increase of Days with Disaster
will increase the value of Burglary by 0.28%. As a result, the null hypothesis is rejected. Social
Disorganization also significantly predicted Burglary, B = 0.38, t(175) = 3.01, p = .003, which
indicates that, on average, a 1% increase of Social Disorganization will increase the value of
Burglary by 0.38%. Population Density did not significantly predict Burglary, B = -0.01, t(175) =
-0.10, p = .924 and Disaster Consequences did not significantly predict Burglary, B = 0.11,
t(175) = 1.13, p = .258. Table 6 summarizes the results of the regression model.
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Table 6. Results for Linear Regression with Days with Disaster, Social Disorganization, Disaster
Consequences, and Population Density predicting Burglary.
Variable
(Intercept)
Days with Disaster
Social Disorganization
Disaster Consequences
Population Density

B
5.24
0.28
0.38
0.11
-0.01

SE
1.10
0.07
0.12
0.09
0.13

95% CI
[3.07, 7.42]
[0.13, 0.42]
[0.13, 0.62]
[-0.08, 0.29]
[-0.26, 0.24]

β
0.00
0.30
0.23
0.08
-0.01

t
4.76
3.82
3.01
1.13
-0.10

p
< .001
< .001
.003
.258
.924

Note. Results: F(4,175) = 5.75, p < .001, R2 = 0.12
Ha5: Days with Disaster Predicts Auto Theft
Assumptions
A linear regression analysis was conducted using log-transformed variables, to determine
if Days with Disaster significantly predicted Auto Theft, while including Population Density,
Social Disorganization, and Disaster Consequences in the model. The data met all regression
assumptions except the Lilliefors-Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicated that the normality
assumption was violated (D = 0.11, p < .001). However, the Central Limits Theorem indicates
that means will be approximately normally distributed in a sufficiently large sample (n > 30)
(LaMorte, 2016), so the violation of normality likely carries limited impact on this analysis,
given the size of the sample (n=180). The modified Breusch-Pagan was used to adjust for nonnormality of the residuals, and the test indicated that the homoscedasticity assumption was met
(p = .143). All predictors in the regression model have VIFs between 1.09 and 1.20, which is
well below the allowable VIF upper limit of 10 (Menard, 2009), indicating that the
multicollinearity assumption was met. There were also no outliers, and the Durbin-Watson test
for autocorrelation among residuals was not significant (DW = 2.10, p = .754), suggesting there
was little to no autocorrelation among the residuals.
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Results
The results of the linear regression model were significant, F(4,175) = 5.31, p < .001, R2
= 0.11, indicating that approximately 11% of the variance in Auto Theft is explainable by Days
with Disaster, Population Density, and Social Disorganization. Days with Disaster significantly
predicted Auto Theft, B = 0.18, t(175) = 1.98, p = .049, which indicates that, on average, a 1%
increase in Days with Disaster will increase the value of Auto Theft by 0.18%. As a result, the
null hypothesis is rejected. Population Density also significantly predicted Auto Theft, B = 0.34,
t(175) = 2.11, p = .037, indicating that, on average, a 1% increase of Population Density will
increase the value of Auto Theft by 0.34%. Social Disorganization significantly predicted Auto
Theft, B = 0.67, t(175) = 4.19, p < .001, which indicates that, on average, a 1% increase of Social
Disorganization will increase the value of Auto Theft by 0.67%. Disaster Consequences did not
significantly predict Auto Theft, B = 0.10, t(175) = 0.87, p = .386. Table 7 summarizes the
results of the regression model.
Table 7. Results for Linear Regression with Days with Disaster, Population Density, Social
Disorganization, and Disaster Consequences predicting Auto Theft.
Variable
(Intercept)
Days with Disaster
Population Density
Social Disorganization
Disaster Consequences

B
1.30
0.18
0.34
0.67
0.10

SE
1.40
0.09
0.16
0.16
0.12

95% CI
[-1.47, 4.07]
[0.00, 0.37]
[0.02, 0.66]
[0.35, 0.98]
[-0.13, 0.34]

β
0.00
0.16
0.16
0.32
0.06

t
0.92
1.98
2.11
4.19
0.87

p
.357
.049
.037
< .001
.386

Note. Results: F(4,175) = 5.31, p < .001, R2 = 0.11
Ha6: Days with Disaster Does Not Predict Larceny
Assumptions
A linear regression analysis was conducted using log-transformed variables, to determine
if Days with Disaster significantly predicted Larceny, while incorporating Population Density,
Social Disorganization, and Disaster Consequences into the model. The data met all regression
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assumptions except normality and lack of outliers. The Lilliefors-Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
indicated that the normality assumption was violated (D = 0.11, p < .001). However, the Central
Limits Theorem indicates that means will be approximately normally distributed in a sufficiently
large sample (n > 30) (LaMorte, 2016), so the violation of normality likely carries limited impact
on this analysis, given the size of the sample (n=180). Studentized residuals also revealed one
outlier, which was found to be a legitimate data point. Further analysis with the outlier trimmed
using the Winsor method (Vijendra & Shivani, 2014) did not significantly change the results, so
the outlier was left in the data. The modified Breusch-Pagan was used to adjust for nonnormality of the residuals, and the test indicated that the homoscedasticity assumption was met
(p = .541). All predictors in the regression model have VIFs between 1.09 and 1.20, which is
well below the allowable VIF upper limit of 10 (Menard, 2009), indicating that the
multicollinearity assumption was met. A Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelation among residuals
was not significant (DW = 1.85, p = .150), suggesting there was little to no autocorrelation
among the residuals.
Results
The results of the linear regression model were significant, F(4,175) = 6.50, p < .001, R2
= 0.13, indicating that approximately 13% of the variance in Larceny is explainable by
Population Density and Social Disorganization. However, Days with Disaster did not
significantly predict Larceny, B = 0.00, t(175) = 0.08, p = .933, resulting in failure to reject the
null hypothesis. Disaster Consequences also did not significantly predict Larceny, B = 0.04,
t(175) = 0.55, p = .586. Population Density significantly predicted Larceny, B = -0.22, t(175) = 2.46, p = .015, which indicates that, on average, a 1% increase in Population Density will
decrease the value of Larceny by 0.22%. Social Disorganization also significantly predicted
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Larceny, B = 0.30, t(175) = 3.50, p < .001, indicating that, on average, a 1% increase in Social
Disorganization will increase the value of Larceny by 0.30%. Table 8 summarizes the results of
the regression model.
Table 8. Results for Linear Regression with Disaster Consequences, Days with Disaster,
Population Density, and Social Disorganization predicting Larceny.
Variable
(Intercept)
Disaster Consequences
Days with Disaster
Population Density
Social Disorganization

B
9.17
0.04
0.00
-0.22
0.30

SE
0.77
0.07
0.05
0.09
0.09

95% CI
[7.65, 10.69]
[-0.09, 0.17]
[-0.10, 0.10]
[-0.39, -0.04]
[0.13, 0.48]

β
0.00
0.04
0.01
-0.18
0.27

t
11.92
0.55
0.08
-2.46
3.50

p
< .001
.586
.933
.015
< .001

Note. Results: F(4,175) = 6.50, p < .001, R2 = 0.13
Ha7: Days with Disaster Does Not Predict Assault
Assumptions
A linear regression analysis was conducted using log-transformed variables, to determine
if Days with Disaster significantly predicted Assault, while incorporating Population Density,
Social Disorganization, and Disaster Consequences into the model. The data met all regression
assumptions except normality of residuals and homoscedasticity. The Lilliefors-KolmogorovSmirnov test indicated that the normality assumption was violated (D = 0.08, p = .013). All
predictors in the regression model have VIFs between 1.09 and 1.20, which is well below the
allowable VIF upper limit of 10 (Menard, 2009), indicating that the multicollinearity assumption
was met. A Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelation among residuals was not significant (DW =
2.19, p = .894), suggesting there was little to no autocorrelation among the residuals. The
Breusch-Pagan test indicated that the homoscedasticity assumption was violated (p < .001), so a
regression with robust standard errors was conducted (Cribari-Neto & Lima, 2014) using the
HC3 method (Mansournia et al., 2020).
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Results
The results of the linear regression model were significant, F(4,175) = 19.43, p < .001, R2
= 0.31, indicating that approximately 31% of the variance in Assault is explainable by Social
Disorganization, while including Disaster Consequences, Days with Disaster, and Population
Density in the model. Social Disorganization significantly predicted Assault, B = 0.85, t(175) =
6.90, p < .001, indicating that, on average, a 1% increase of Social Disorganization will increase
the value of Assault by 0.85%. Disaster Consequences did not significantly predict Assault, B =
0.05, t(175) = 0.54, p = .592 and neither did Population Density, B = -0.04, t(175) = -0.47, p =
.641. Additionally, Days with Disaster did not predict assault, B = 0.10, t(175) = 1.59, p = .113,
resulting in failure to reject the null hypothesis. Table 9 summarizes the results of the regression
model.
Table 9. Results for Linear Regression with Disaster Consequences, Days with Disaster,
Population Density, and Social Disorganization predicting Assault.
Variable
(Intercept)
Disaster Consequences
Days with Disaster
Population Density
Social Disorganization

B
4.10
0.05
0.10
-0.04
0.85

Robust SE
0.69
0.09
0.06
0.08
0.12

95% CI
[2.75, 5.46]
[-0.13, 0.22]
[-0.02, 0.21]
[-0.20, 0.13]
[0.61, 1.10]

β
0.00
0.04
0.11
-0.02
0.57

t
5.97
0.54
1.59
-0.47
6.90

p
< .001
.592
.113
.641
< .001

Note. Results: F(4,175) = 19.43, p < .001, R2 = 0.31
RQ 2: Do Social Disorganization Factors Moderate the Relationship Between Number of
Days with Major Weather Events or Disasters, and Index Crime Rates in the Ten Most
Populated Cities in Texas?
In an attempt to further examine the role of Social Disorganization Theory relative to
disaster crime, moderation analyses were conducted for any models wherein the Social
Disorganization composite variable was found to be a significant predictor of the crime in
question. The findings indicate that Social Disorganization positively moderates the relationship
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between Days with Disaster and Burglary. However, moderation was not supported for any of
the other Index Crimes in the study. The assumptions necessary of the moderation analyses were
the same as those listed above, so they are not discussed below.
Ha12: Social Disorganization Moderates the Relationship Between Days with Disaster and
Burglary
In keeping with the Baron and Kenny’s (1986) method, moderation analysis was
conducted using mean centering, to assess if Social Disorganization moderated the relationship
between Days with Disaster and Burglary. A simple effects model was created using linear
regression with Burglary as the DV and Days with Disaster as the IV. A non-interaction model
was also created by adding Social Disorganization to the predictor in the simple effects model
above. In the third step, an interaction model was created by adding the interaction between Days
with Disaster and Social Disorganization to the predictors in the non-interaction model above.
Two conditions must be met for moderation to be supported (Netemeyer et al., 2001). Days with
Disaster must significantly predict Burglary in the simple effects model and the interaction
model must also explain significantly more variance of Burglary than the non-interaction model.
Failure to meet either condition means moderation is not supported.
Results
The first condition was met since Days with Disaster significantly predicted Burglary, B
= 0.23, t(178) = 3.41, p < .001. The second condition was assessed using a partial F-test to
determine if the interaction model explained more variance in Burglary than the non-interaction
model. The partial F-test, F(1,176) = 5.85, p = .017, indicated that the interaction model
explained significantly more variance than the non-interaction model, so the second condition
was met. Since Days with Disaster significantly predicted Burglary in the simple effects model
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(condition 1) and the interaction model explained significantly more variance of Burglary than
the non-interaction model (condition 2) moderation is supported. The results of the simple, noninteraction, and interaction models are presented in Table 10.
Table 10. Moderation Analysis Table with Burglary Predicted by Days with Disaster Moderated
by Social Disorganization.
Predictor
Step 1: Simple Effects Model
(Intercept)
Days with Disaster

B

SE

β

t

p

6.06
0.23

0.19
0.07

0.25

32.12
3.41

< .001
< .001

Step 2: Non-Interaction Model
(Intercept)
Days with Disaster
Social Disorganization

5.12
0.30
0.37

0.36
0.07
0.12

0.32
0.23

14.33
4.28
3.09

< .001
< .001
.002

Step 3: Interaction Model
(Intercept)
Days with Disaster
Social Disorganization
Days with Disaster : Social Disorganization

6.72
0.22
0.40
0.53

0.04
0.08
0.12
0.22

0.23
0.25
0.19

168.36
2.87
3.36
2.42

< .001
.005
< .001
.017

Social Disorganization significantly moderated the effect of Days with Disaster on
Burglary, B = 0.53, t(176) = 2.42, p = .017, so the null hypothesis is rejected. This indicates that
on average, a 1% increase of Social Disorganization will cause a 0.53% increase in the slope of
Days with Disaster on Burglary. Table 11 presents a comparison of the non-interaction and
interaction models.
Table 11. Linear Model Comparison Table between the Non-Interaction and Interaction Model.
Model
Non-Interaction
Interaction

2

R
0.11
0.14

F

df

p

5.85

1

.017

In order to visualize the moderation analysis, Social Disorganization was dichotomized
into High and Low categories at the median. Figure 3 shows the regression lines for Burglary
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predicted by Days with Disaster for the High and Low categories of Social Disorganization. The
High category indicates all observations of Social Disorganization above the median, and the
Low category indicates all observations of Social Disorganization below the median.
Figure 3. Regression Lines for Burglary predicted by Days with Disaster for the High and Low
Categories of Social Disorganization.

Ha8-11; 13-14: Social Disorganization Does Not Moderate Relationships Between Days with
Disaster and Other Index Crimes
Days with Disaster did not significantly predict Murder, B = 0.18, t(178) = 1.86, p = .065,
Assault, B = -0.05, t(178) = -0.82, p = .414, Larceny, B = -0.06, t(178) = -1.32, p = .189, Auto
Theft, B = 0.12, t(178) = 1.36, p = .176, resulting in failure to reject the remaining null
hypotheses. Since the first moderation condition was not met, moderation was not supported for
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Murder, Assault, Larceny, and Theft. Analysis of the remaining variables, Rape and Robbery,
indicated that the first moderation condition was met, but the second condition was not met.
Days with Disaster significantly predicted Rape, B = 0.11, t(178) = 2.24, p = .026.
However, the partial F-test, F(1,176) = 0.32, p = .572, indicated that the interaction model did
not explain significantly more variance than the non-interaction model. Days with Disaster
significantly predicted Robbery, B = 0.30, t(178) = 3.34, p = .001. However, the partial F-test,
F(1,176) = 2.58, p = .110, indicated that the interaction model did not explain significantly more
variance than the non-interaction model. Since the second moderations condition was not met for
Rape or Robbery, moderation was not supported for either variable.
Additionally, although the RQs and hypotheses did not require any additional analysis,
moderation analyses were also conducted by reversing the variables to determine if Days with
Disaster moderates the relationship between Social Disorganization and the crimes in this study.
None of the moderation analyses were supported when the two predictor variables were rotated
with one another.
Summary of Results
Overall, the findings reflect that increases in Days with Disaster significantly predicted
increases in Murder, Burglary, Robbery, Rape, and Auto Theft, while incorporating Social
Disorganization, Population Density, and Disaster Consequences into the model. The models
also show that Days with Disaster, when combined with various combinations of Social
Disorganization and Population Density, often predicted increases to the above crimes. Days
with Disaster did not significantly predict Larceny or Assault. Table 12 summarizes the models
where Days with Disaster was a significant predictor of a crime.
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Table 12. Results of Linear Regression Models Where Days with Disaster Predicted Crime.
Models
Model Predicting Robbery
Days with Disaster
Social Disorganization
Population Density
Disaster Consequences

R2
F
.20 10.86
-

DF
4,175
-

B
0.40
0.86
0.39
0.08

SE
0.09
0.16
0.16
0.12

β
0.32
0.40
0.17
0.05

t
4.33
5.39
2.41
0.68

p
< .001
< .001
< .001
.017
.499

Model Predicting Murder
Days with Disaster
Social Disorganization
Population Density
Disaster Consequences

.19 10.17
-

4,175
-

0.30
1.01
0.35
0.15

0.10
0.17
0.17
0.13

0.23
0.44
0.14
0.08

3.01
5.96
2.02
1.17

< .001
.003
< .001
.045
.242

Model Predicting Rape
Days with Disaster
Social Disorganization
Population Density
Disaster Consequences

.14
-

7.35
-

4,175
-

0.18
0.31
-0.23
0.04

0.05* 0.27
0.31* 0.26
0.11* -0.18
0.67* 0.05

3.61
2.33
-1.99
0.66

< .001
< .001
.021
.048
.513

Model Predicting Burglary
Days with Disaster
Social Disorganization
Population Density
Disaster Consequences

.12
-

5.75
-

4,175
-

0.28
0.38
-0.01
0.11

0.07 0.30
0.12 0.23
0.13 -0.01
0.09 0.08

3.82
3.01
-0.10
1.13

< .001
< .001
.003
.924
.258

Model Predicting Auto Theft
Days with Disaster
Social Disorganization
Population Density
Disaster Consequences

.11
-

5.31
-

4,175
-

0.18
0.67
0.34
0.10

1.98
4.19
2.11
0.87

< .001
.049
< .001
.037
.386

0.09
0.16
0.16
0.12

0.16
0.32
0.16
0.06

*Robust Standard Errors
Note: Days with Disaster did not predict Larceny or Assault, so they were excluded from this
summary table.
Finally, moderation analysis revealed that Social Disorganization increases the impact of
Days with Disaster on Burglary. However, Social Disorganization did not affect the impact of
Days with Disaster on any other crimes being studied. The next chapter will discuss the
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implications of the findings, incorporate the relevant literature, and identify directions for future
research.
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION
Overview
This dissertation uses Social Disorganization Theory as a foundation to examine the
relationship between number of days with disaster or major weather event, and crime in the 10
largest cities in Texas. Multiple regressions and moderation analyses were conducted, with
models that incorporated Days with Disaster, Social Disorganization, Population Density, and
Disaster Consequences, and all Index Crimes other than Arson. Days with Disaster significantly
predicted Robbery, Murder, Rape, Burglary, and Auto Theft, but did not significantly predict
Larceny or Assault. Additionally, Social Disorganization and Population Density were often
found to predict crime. Moderation analysis also revealed that Social Disorganization increases
the effect of Days with Disaster on Burglary rates.
RQ 1: Does Number of Days with Major Weather Events or Disasters Significantly Predict
Index Crime Rates in the Ten Most Populated Cities in Texas?
The null hypotheses that Days with Disaster would not predict crime were rejected for
Robbery, Murder, Rape, Burglary, and Auto Theft. The findings also resulted in a failure to
reject the null hypothesis for Larceny and Assault. Although no research could be located
examining the relationship between Days with Disaster and crime, these findings can be folded
into the existing broader disaster crime body of work. These findings indicate that increases in
the number of major weather events and disaster incidents are associated with increases in
Burglary, Robbery, Auto Theft, Rape, and Murder in the cities studied.
Although no studies were located assessing long term relationships between Days with
Disaster and crime, these findings reinforce other studies showing that certain crimes increase
associated with disasters (Augusto et al, 2020; Prelog, 2016; Spencer, 2017; Spencer & Stobl,
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2019; Weil et al., 2019; Zahnow et al., 2017). However, these findings also seem to refute other
author’s findings that indicate some crimes decrease during disaster (Augusto, 2020; Bretzke et
al., 2018; Bretzke & Andresen, 2018; Herber, 2014; Zahnow et al., 2017). The seemingly
contradictory findings among researchers are at least partially likely a reflection of different
levels of measurement. This study focuses on city-level data, while others often focus on countylevel data.
Additionally, some studies are limited to broad categories of Index Crimes like violent
crimes or property crimes, while other studies, such as this one, parse out the crimes into
individual Index Crimes. Further inconsistencies probably occur when researchers study
different constructs of a phenomenon, such as Disaster Frequency, Days with Disaster, or
Disaster Consequences, all using different data. Additionally, comparing findings is also difficult
when one researcher studies solely hurricanes while other researchers study natural disasters or,
in the case of this dissertation, major weather events and disasters. At face value, these studies
might seem to report on the same factors, but the connections between study findings become
much less concrete with so many discrete differences in study designs and data used.
However, it should be noted that these data are studied at the city level, which is a
previously unstudied unit of analysis for longitudinal studies. That alone might account for the
apparent contradictive findings between this research and past research. Research might also
show a trend that data grouped at the level most distant from the phenomenon results in
seemingly smaller associations between disaster and crime. For example, studying crime at the
county level provides a view of the phenomenon, but studying at the city level provides a more
refined view. Studying crime at the zip code or police beat level would likely provide an even
more magnified view of the changes to crime rates and crime patterns. Indeed, studying
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concentrated areas possibly around the path of a weather or flood zones has provided some
insight into disaster crime and how it moves around the disaster (Spencer, 2017). However, most
of these approaches lend themselves more toward studying a single disaster in great detail, as
opposed to the macro view of the relationship between disaster and crime that can be provided
by studying several major metropolitan areas using decades of data. Essentially, although a
micro view of crime during disaster can provide valuable information, the approach also limits
researchers’ ability to answer the question of disaster’s impact on crime in general terms.
In addition, this study focuses on Days with Disaster where other studies focused on
other constructs of one or more disasters, which might account for other seemingly contradictory
findings. For example, a study of daily crime totals of Houston during Hurricane Harvey showed
a statistically significant increase in Burglaries by 287%, and statistically significant decreases in
Thefts (54%), Robberies (48%), and Auto Thefts (32%) (Augusto, 2020). At a glance, the
current study’s findings seem unsupportive of Augusto’s (2020) findings. However, that study
was cross sectional, and focused on a brief period during a single disaster, with no incorporation
of long-term impacts of repeated disasters and weather events on the community.
Given past research findings, it does seem reasonable that an increase in the number of
disasters would be linked to an increase in crimes since individual disasters were also paired with
such increases. However, this study specifies a relationship between total days per year with a
major weather event or disaster and crime rates. That specific relationship is a unique addition
that adds to a fuller picture of the disaster crime body of work. Although a single disaster will
almost certainly have impacts on crime, this study indicates that the repeated battering of a city
with frequent disasters and major weather events over the course of decades is a different
phenomenon with unique impacts on crime rates.
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One might also question why all the studied crimes showed a significant positive
relationship between disaster and crime except Larceny and Assault. Larceny and Assault may
differ from expectations since law enforcement officers reported a realignment of priorities
toward life-saving tasks and major crimes during disasters (Augusto et al., 2020). Larceny and
assault may be two crimes that go unreported or are de-prioritized among the major calls-forservice during disasters and major weather events.
Although the bulk of the discussion related to Social Disorganization Theory occurs
below, the findings from RQ 1 reinforce Social Disorganization Theory as a way of explaining
changes to crime. In every regression model, Social Disorganization was also the strongest
significant predictor of crime above Days with Disaster, Disaster Consequences, and Population
Density. These findings reinforce the importance of Social Disorganization in explaining crime,
at least at the macro level.
RQ 2: Do Social Disorganization Factors Moderate the Relationship Between Number of
Days with Major Weather Events or Disasters, and Index Crime Rates in the Ten Most
Populated Cities in Texas?
The findings resulted in failure to reject the null hypotheses that Social Disorganization
does not moderate the relationship between Days with Disaster and crime for Robbery, Murder,
Rape, Larceny, Assault, and Auto Theft. The null hypothesis was rejected for Burglary. Social
Disorganization was found to moderate the relationship between Days with Disaster and
Burglary. The results indicated that Social Disorganization worsened the impacts of Days with
Disaster on Burglary rates. The question remains regarding why Burglary was the only crime for
which moderation was supported. Burglary is often considered to be a proxy for Looting in
disasters (Harper & Frailing, 2017), so it seems reasonable that increased Days with Disaster
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would result in more instances of Burglary or Looting, and that trend is magnified in low
income, disorganized areas due to a combination of increased need and increased vulnerability.
Days with Disaster as a Social Disorganization Factor
The findings of this study provide a level of evidence for the argument that Days with
Disaster should be added to the generally accepted Social Disorganization factors. This claim
should perhaps be unsurprising given the history of disasters disproportionately impacting lowincome communities (Hallegatte et al., 2020; SAMHSA, 2017). Poor people are more likely to
face heightened impacts from natural disasters for a few reasons.
According to Hallegatte et al. (2020), at-risk areas may be more attractive to poor people
because those areas are typically cheaper, and offer more opportunity and income, and provide
relatively increased public services. Additionally, poor people often settle in low-income areas,
which have less public infrastructure to protection against hazards. Lower income people are also
more likely to have an increased percentage of their finances and assets depleted by damage
from disasters, simply due to having less resources to begin with. In addition, people in poverty,
with low incomes, and with less education have all been found to be less prepared for disasters
than other groups and to have less resources to respond to official warnings or evacuations
regarding incoming disasters (SAMHSA, 2017). One could assert that Socially Disorganized
communities face the same increased vulnerability to disaster that is generally associated with
the socially vulnerable people above since Socially Disorganized communities have the same
deteriorating infrastructure, unemployment, reduced education levels, and low income (Frailing
& Harper, 2017; Nogami, 2018).
Indeed, several researchers have argued that Social Disorganization is increased with
disaster and used Social Disorganization Theory as a foundation for their research (Harper &
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Frailing, 2017; Prelog, 2016). This nexus seems intuitive, since disasters are known to cause
residential displacement, family upheaval, and negative economic impacts, with particularly
negative outcomes in already disorganized urban areas with high social vulnerability (Hallegatte
et al., 2020; SAMHSA, 2017). However, the above argument relates to a temporary
phenomenon, albeit across the extended disaster cycle. These findings suggest that the
aforementioned argument should be extended, and Days with Disaster as a construct should be
added as an ever-present, if perhaps undulating, Social Disorganization Factor in specific urban
areas.
This study found that Social Disorganization works jointly with Days with Disaster and
Population Density to predict crime in cities, and even increases the negative impacts of Days
with Disaster on Burglary rates. It follows that Days with Disaster should be considered an
additional Social Disorganization factor that predicts increased crime rates in a community.
However, despite the utility of Social Disorganization Theory in explaining crime in general, and
its relationships with disaster crime, the theory offers little to no insight into individual decision
making relative to crime during disasters. Thus, a Unified Disaster Crime Theory is in order,
which combines Social Disorganization, Rational Choice Theory, and RA Theory.
Proposing a Unified Disaster Crime Theory
This section proposes a Unified Disaster Crime Theory (UDC Theory) based on these
findings and the studies discussed in this dissertation. Researchers have used Cohen and Felson’s
(1979) RA Theory to explain disaster crime (Breetzke et al., 2018; Prelog, 2016). Other studies
have posited the argument that disasters decrease Capable Guardianship and increase the number
of Suitable Targets, which in turn increases the Motivation of Offenders (Augusto et al., 2020).
Frailing and Harper (2015, 2017) also found the RA Theory component of Guardianship to be a
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factor in crime rates in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. According to Frailing and Harper
(2017), New Orleans Police Department was fractured and facing a level of disarray after
Hurricane Katrina, leading to less police presence than normal, which appeared to be a factor in
crime rates associated with Katrina, particularly when compared to past disasters impacting New
Orleans.
Some recent studies have also combined both Social Disorganization and RA Theory to
explain crime in non-disaster situations. Louderback and Sen Roy (2018) used the two theories
as a framework to study community crime watch programs in Florida. They found that crime
declined the most in neighborhoods that had crime watch programs, which provided some
support to the two theories since the programs increase Guardianship while also indicating
neighborhood solidarity that shows a level of social organization. Additionally, Piscitelli and
Doherty (2018) researched spatial distribution of neighborhood crime by creating a concept map
incorporating the theories to explain the connection between the theories and the crime. They
found ecological disadvantage to be the key link between RA Theory and Social Disorganization
Theory, and that the combination of the theories is a more appropriate explanation of
neighborhood crime than either individual theory.
Other researchers connected Social Disorganization Theory to RA Theory as a
foundation to explain property crime during disasters (Frailing & Harper, 2017). Social
Disorganization was applied to conditions prior to disaster that facilitate crime and RA Theory
was applied to factors during and after disasters that lead to individual criminal acts. Researchers
have also applied the two theories to crime after Hurricane Hugo (Quarantelli, 2007; Tierney et
al., 2007) and crime in New York and New Jersey after Hurricane Sandy (Frailing & Harper,
2015). More recently, Frailing and Harper (2017) used a longitudinal focus on pre-existing
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Social Disorganization factors as a foundation for their argument that higher levels of Social
Disorganization before a disaster may increase the likelihood of crime occurring after the
disaster. Despite the studies above and others using multiple theories to explain various
components of disaster crime no UDC Theory currently exists.
Outlining UDC Theory
This dissertation’s findings are just one part of a bigger understanding of disaster crime.
This dissertation helps to reinforce the importance of Social Disorganization Theory to
understanding disaster crime. However, these findings also show that Social Disorganization
Theory is not a catch-all theory that can explain all facets of disaster crime. The theory proposed
below applies a combination of commonly accepted criminological theories to the disaster
environment, to explain more of the disaster crime phenomenon than any one theory could
explain.
UDC Theory could be said to be based on changes that occur surrounding disasters. One
type of change occurs at the macro or environmental level and creates more opportunities for
crime as the RA Theory factors change. Components I and II of UDC Theory below best align
with the macro or environmental type of change from disaster. The first two components of UDC
Theory paint a picture of changes to the overall disaster environment. Components III and IV of
UDC theory address an individual’s decision-making process in the disaster environment with an
increased number of crime decisions faced by people, while adding a more treacherous
backdrop, and adding increased consequences for those decisions. Components III and IV of
UDC Theory best align with the individual decision-making changes that are associated with
disasters. The four key components below shape UDC Theory.
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I. RA Theory is the foundation and core of UDC Theory, and the three RA Theory factors
of Suitable Targets, lack of Capable Guardians, and presence of a Motivated Offender are
necessary for a crime to occur. However, the interplay between RA Theory, Social
Disorganization Theory, and Rational Choice Theory during disaster is what defines
UDC Theory.
II. Disaster, by its nature, changes the RA Theory factors that are the core of UDC Theory as
well as the interplay between the three factors. Thus, crime changes surrounding
disasters, and the nature of that change is dependent upon many factors.
III. UDC Theory expands the concept of the Motivated Offender and establishes the Potential
Offender. The Potential Offender and the Motivated Offender are the key nexus between
the disaster environment and disaster crime. The Potential Offender and Motivated
Offender use Rational Choice to make crime decisions during disasters.
IV. As with RA Theory, the presence of a Motivated Offender remains as one of the three
key requirements that must intersect for a crime to occur. However, under UDC Theory,
the Motivation level and decisions of the Offender in the disaster environment are
thought to be influenced by the presence of Capable Guardianship, Suitable Targets,
disaster magnitude and proximity, Days with Disaster, Social Disorganization, and
available alternatives to crime.
UDC Theory Components I and II: Environmental Changes During Disasters
Component I: RA Theory is the Foundation with Support from Social Disorganization
Theory and Rational Choice Theory
As a primer, RA Theory emphasizes the need for three factors to be present
simultaneously in order for crime to occur. A Motivated Offender, Suitable Target, and lack of
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Capable Guardianship must all be present (Cohen and Felson, 1979). Rational Choice Theory
emphasizes the use of a measured decision-making process undergone by offenders (Cornish &
Clarke, 1986). Social Disorganization Theory (Shaw & McKay, 1942), as discussed in Chapter
two of this dissertation, posits that several factors, such as racial heterogeneity, residential
mobility, low income, unemployment, low education levels, and other factors alter social norms
and interpersonal connectedness in a neighborhood, and are associated with increased crime in
the area. Taken together, RA Theory presents the ingredients necessary for a crime to occur,
Rational Choice Theory explains the individual decision-making process of the offender, and
Social Disorganization Theory describes the backdrop or neighborhood environment that sets the
stage for an increased likelihood that people in a neighborhood will resort to criminal activity.
Under the UDC Theory, the three RA Theory factors remain necessary for a crime to
occur. Further, under UDC Theory, as with RA Theory, at the point when the disaster crime
occurs, lack of Capable Guardianship, and presence of Suitable Targets will generally need to
meet the standards of the Motivated Offender. The Motivated Offender will need to be present to
the degree necessary to commit the crime, and they will need to make a decision to commit a
crime based on their interpretation and estimation of a Suitable Target and Capable
Guardianship. Under UDC Theory, with RA Theory as a foundation, Rational Choice Theory
explains the decision-making process that helps to increase the motivation level of a Potential
Offender. That Rational Choice is also heavily influenced by the impacts of disaster in the area,
Days with Disaster, Social Disorganization, available alternatives to crime, Capable
Guardianship, and Suitable Targets.
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Component II: Disaster Alters each of the Three RA Theory Factors as Well as the
Interplay Between the Factors
Figures 4, 5, and 6 present some of the potential disaster factors that can increase or
decrease each of the RA Theory factors (Augusto, 2020; Augusto et al., 2020; Frailing & Harper,
2017). Depending upon the nature of the disaster, pre-existing community conditions like Social
Disorganization or the disaster response, community members will likely see differences in how
each factor changes in their particular area. One might note that some of the changes listed could
increase an RA Theory factor in a specific block, but that same item might be decreased in a
neighboring block, resulting in the neighboring block experiencing a decrease in that same RA
Theory factor, despite facing the same disaster.
Figure 4. Potential Changes to Capable Guardianship During Disaster.
Potential Changes to Capable Guardianship During Disaster

Presence of the National Guard
Increased Police and Security in Some Areas
Property Owners Sheltering in Place
Perceived Increases in Property Owners’ Defensive Postures

Property Owners and Businesses Evacuated
Police Focused on Emergencies Instead of Pro-Active Policing
Decreased Police Presence in Some Areas
Security System Failure Due to Weather Issues
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Figure 5. Potential Changes to Suitable Targets During Disaster.
Potential Changes to Suitable Targets During Disaster
Increased Willingness to Victimize Fellow Community Members in a
Socially Disorganized Community
Damage to Structures Increases Accessibility and Suitability of Targets
Increases in Disaster Assistance Funding Creates Opportunities for Fraud
Overwhelmed Disaster Victims Become More Suitable Targets

Disaster Victims Viewed as Less Suitable Targets Due to Having Nothing
Left to Take
People Viewed as Less Suitable Targets Due to a Sense of Empathy for
Them as Fellow Disaster Victims
Some Structures Become Inaccessible Due to the Disaster Environment
Structures Damaged to the Point of Being an Unattractive Target

Figure 6. Potential Changes to Motivated Offenders During Disaster.

Potential Changes to Motivated Offenders During Disaster
Increases to Suitable Targets
Decreases to Capable Guardianship
Perceived Lack of Options Due to Disaster
Further Limited Resources from Social Disorganization and Disaster
Desperation Increases as Resources Decrease

Decreases to Suitable Targets
Increases to Capable Guardianship
Decreased Willingness to Victimize Fellow Community Members Due to
Galvanizing Effect of Disasters

The figures above depict some of the possible increases or decreases to each RA Theory
factor in a particular neighborhood during a disaster. However, the interplay between the three
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RA Theory factors can also change because of disaster in an area. Figure 7 below illustrates how
the three RA Theory factors might change as a whole, in a neighborhood during the time period
surrounding a disaster. It follows that crime trends would also differ under those differing
conditions between neighborhoods and disasters.
For example, Augusto et al. (2020) found decreased Capable Guardianship during
disasters. However, Frailing and Harper (2017) discussed the increased presence of the National
Guard in New Orleans during Hurricane Betsy. The National Guard represented an increase in
Guardianship during that disaster and was thought to be at least a partial reason for lower crime
rates in certain areas as compared to Hurricane Gustav and Hurricane Katrina, which had lower
Guardianship in New Orleans, and saw increased crime in the city. These serve as examples of
different cities experiencing unique and even contrary changes during different disasters.
Figure 7 illustrates one way in which the three RA Theory factors might change as a
group during the time period surrounding a disaster. The figure illustrates a disaster situation that
results in a decrease in Capable Guardianship paired with increases to Suitable Targets and
Motivated Offenders. Under UDC Theory, this situation would be associated with an increase in
some crimes.
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Figure 7. UDC Theory Example of Changes to RA Theory Factors During Disaster.

The ever-changing nature of disasters and the varied impacts on Guardianship, Suitable
Targets, and Motivated Offenders can impact one neighborhood differently than another during
the same disaster or during different disasters. This is likely one reason for the seemingly
inconsistent results from disaster crime research. In addition, several other factors, discussed
below, serve as important elements that impact decision making related to disaster crime.
UDC Theory Components III and IV: Changes to Individual Decision-Making During
Disasters
Component III: Potential Offenders and Motivated Offenders use Rational Choice to
make crime decisions during disasters.
The Motivated Offender is a necessary part of the RA Theory equation in order for a
crime to occur. However, under UDC Theory, the Motivated Offender begins as a Potential
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Offender until they become motivated to commit the crime in the disaster context. The Potential
Offender either becomes a Motivated Offender or remains a Potential Offender. Once they
become a Motivated Offender, they make the decision to commit a crime or not commit a crime,
based on Rational Choice and interpretation of their surroundings throughout the disaster
process. This process is depicted under Rational Choice Theory.
One notable difference in the disaster context, and one that informed the need to delineate
a Potential Offender role, is that, unlike what might be found in non-disaster situations, a
considerable number of otherwise law-abiding members of the community find themselves
considering crime or committing crime because of the difficulties inherent in disasters (Augusto
et al., 2020). Under UDC Theory, the Motivated Offender begins as a Potential Offender and
only transitions to a Motivated Offender through a decision-making process that aligns with
Rational Choice Theory. Those two pathways repeat throughout the disaster with each scenario
faced by the Potential Offender and the Motivated Offender, and each person goes through one
or more crime decision processes as their particular disaster experience unfolds.
Readers should keep in mind that the UDC Theory process above will have a different
interpretation, depending upon lens of the Potential Offender and the context of the situation.
Thus, a situation and environment might result in one person continuing to be a Potential
Offender while another person in the same situation might become a Motivated Offender based
on their interpretation and decision making. One example might be a mother of three children
who decides to vandalize an unsecured vending machine in order to feed her children, due to
what she perceives as a lack of options. In that moment, she transitions from a Potential Offender
to a Motivated Offender who commits a crime. Another example might be an individual in a
high crime area who has learned that businesses are unsecured during disasters. That person
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transitions from Potential Offender to Motivated Offender at the outset of the disaster and
remains a Motivated Offender for days while they await an opportunity to burglarize a business
for non-essential items.
Component IV: Factors that Influence Decisions of Potential Offenders and Motivated
Offenders
The process discussed above occurs within the disaster environment where several
factors affect the environment and the individual’s decision-making, and the transition from
Potential Offender to Motivated Offender. All of the factors discussed above, and the
components of the theory are dependent upon an individual’s interpretation of their surroundings
and circumstances. In addition, as described in the looting scenario above, some people who
might be described as ‘career criminals’ are already Motivated Offenders prior to the disaster
occurring, and their willingness to commit crime during disaster is a foregone conclusion. In this
case, their only concern might be how to take advantage of the least amount of Capable
Guardianship for a Suitable Target.
Overall, under UDC Theory, as the Potential Offender undergoes one or more decision
processes, which determine their status as a Motivated Offender and whether they will
subsequently seek to commit one or more crimes. Those decisions are informed in part by the
presence of Capable Guardianship and the presence of a Suitable Target. However, the decisions
are also influenced by availability of alternatives to crime, pre-existing Social Disorganization
factors in the neighborhood, disaster magnitude and proximity, and number of Days with
Disaster. Below are the factors that influence disaster crime and relevant decision making under
UDC Theory.
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Capable Guardianship and Suitable Targets
The disaster process, including disaster warnings, evacuations, the disaster, response, and
the post-disaster environment all shift the balance of the three RA factors. In many cases,
Capable Guardianship is greatly reduced, and Suitable Targets are greatly increased. These
factors combine and contribute to shifts of Potential Offenders into Motivated Offenders
throughout the disaster and at specific points in time during the disaster (Augusto et al., 2020). In
some cases, otherwise law-abiding people choose to commit crimes due to the nature of disaster
leaving them what they perceive to be little choice but to commit crime (Augusto et al., 2020). In
other circumstances, some career criminals make decisions to commit one or more crimes due to
the increase in Suitable Targets and reduced Capable Guardianship and may plan to take
advantage of disaster circumstances. These situations may reflect a portion of the significant
increases in Burglaries during certain disasters (Augusto, 2020). In addition, Spencer and Stoble
(2019) argued that timing and perhaps compliance with disaster warnings likely have an impact
on disaster crime since early warnings and early evacuations leave more structures vacant for
longer, increasing Suitable Targets and lack of Capable Guardianship.
Available Alternatives to Crime
An important factor in UDC Theory is the Potential Offender’s perception of alternatives
to crime. As an example, a scenario that is perhaps unique to disasters would be that of person
trapped in an area due to high waters, having no access to fresh water to drink, and stealing water
from a neighbor’s abandoned house to avoid dehydration and possibly death. The nature of the
disaster environment increases the number of Potential Offenders and the number of situations
where Potential Offenders must evaluate the available alternatives to crime simply in order to
survive.
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Social Disorganization
This study showed that Social Disorganization factors combine with Days with Disaster
to explain a portion of the increases to most Index Crimes in the largest cities in Texas.
Additionally, Social Disorganization was found to amplify the impacts of Days with Disaster on
the number of Burglaries in those cities. It is reasonable that Social Disorganization would
influence a Potential Offender’s decision-making process since disasters have been known to
disproportionately impact communities that exhibit Social Disorganization (Ogie & Prahdan,
2019), and that those communities are known to exhibit increased ‘social vulnerability’ (Sun et
al., 2017; Frigerio et al. 2018; Aksha et al. 2019). Frailing and Harper (2017) also argued that
New Orleans socioeconomic factors, including high inequality rates, accounted for a significant
increase in Burglaries after Hurricane Katrina. Although Social Disorganization is not likely to
be a conscious consideration of a Potential Offender, the backdrop of a disorganized
neighborhood likely shapes the lens applied by the Potential Offender as they undergo the crime
decision process, and based on the above research and these findings, Social Disorganization
increases the likelihood of more Potential Offenders choosing to commit crime during disasters.
Disaster Magnitude and Proximity
Prelog (2016) found that increased disaster magnitude was associated with increases to
county level property crimes. Spencer and Stobl (2019) also found that hurricanes increased
crime by 35%, and more damaging storms have greater crime increases. However, Spencer and
Stobl (2019) also found that the crime rate changes are most pronounced near the hurricane.
These findings reflect the importance of disaster magnitude and proximity to the disaster
epicenter as predictors of crime rates. Although these factors are very unlikely to be a direct part
of the Potential Offender’s thought process, the environment created by increased disaster
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impacts due to proximity or disaster magnitude almost certainly informs the Potential Offender’s
perception of their surroundings and their decision-making processes.
Number of Days with Disaster
This dissertation revealed that increased Days with Disaster are associated with increases
in most Index Crime rates in the largest cities in Texas. UDC Theory explains those findings by
positing that Days with Disaster influences the decision-making process for Potential Offenders
transitioning to Motivated Offenders. A relatively intuitive explanation is that increased Days
with Disaster create more Social Disorganization, increased need for resources, and fewer
alternatives to crime. As a result, as the number of Days with Disaster increases, the environment
becomes more challenging, and an increasing number of Potential Offenders crime decisions
become more frequent and more challenging.
Some of factors above may be a part of a conscious decision-making process, while other
factors are not likely to be directly considered by the Potential Offender or Motivated Offender.
For example, a Potential Offender would likely not consciously consider Social Disorganization
factors in their decision-making, but might react to them, nonetheless. However, an already
Motivated Offender would most likely actively consider, for example, the presence of a Capable
Guardian in their decision on whether to commit a crime during a disaster. Figure 8 depicts the
factors that are direct and indirect influences on the decision-making of Potential Offenders and
Motivated Offenders surrounding disasters.
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Figure 8. Influences on a Potential Offender or Motivated Offender’s Crime Decisions During
Disasters.
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Figure 9 depicts an overview of the changes to individual decision-making during
disasters under UDC Theory. The figure shows separate pathways where a Potential Offender
remains a Potential Offender or becomes a Motivated Offender. After becoming a Motivated
Offender, a person could commit a crime, revert to a Potential Offender, or remain a Motivated
Offender. The figure also shows that Capable Guardians, Suitable Targets, available alternatives
to crime, Social Disorganization, disaster magnitude and proximity, and Days with Disaster
influence the decisions of Potential Offenders and Motivated Offenders.
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Figure 9. Potential Offender and Motivated Offender Decision-Making During Disasters.
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Study Limitations
This study does have some limitations. The above section mentions that timing and
compliance with disaster warnings are likely a factor in disaster crime. This study would have
benefited from incorporating warning timing and compliance into models, although locating such
data across 10 cities is likely unrealistic. The use of aggregate data also limits the inferences one
can make from this research. This study showed that most Index Crimes in the group of 10
largest cities in Texas increase as days with major weather event or disaster increase, even when
incorporating Social Disorganization factors, Population Density, and Disaster Consequences.
However, one risks ecological fallacy by interpreting these findings to indicate that the findings
necessarily apply to any one city.
Additionally, the interpretation of these findings relies upon the R Squared score for each
model to reflect how much variance in the dependent variable is explained by the predictor
variables. This study found that five of the seven Index Crimes being studied were positively
associated with Days with Disaster, but the models all reported relatively low R Squared scores.
Thus, criminological researchers hoping to uncover the factors that predict large portions of the
variance in crime will need to continue their search. However, since the primary goal of this
study is to better understand the relationship between Days with Disaster and crime, the
relatively low effect sizes indicated by the low R Squared scores do not negate the significance
of the results. These findings are still useful in explaining the relationships between Days with
Disaster and crime. Additionally, Wuensch (2019) cautioned researchers against discounting low
effect sizes, since even trivial effect sizes may be a large effect size when applied in a different
context.
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Implications
Practical Implications
Despite the low effect sizes mentioned above, these findings do have some considerable
real-world implications. Days with Disaster significantly predicted Burglary by a seemingly
small amount. However, application of the results of this study to the real world indicates that,
on average, just a single day with a disaster or a major weather event in a city of one million
people also means police can expect an average of 148 additional Burglaries beyond what the
city would experience on average during a year with no days of disaster. Based on the findings
from this study, on average, that city will also experience an additional 46 Robberies, 62 Auto
Thefts, six Rapes, and one Murder that year, beyond what would have otherwise occurred
without the disaster or major weather event. Those crime increases double if the city experiences
a second additional day of disaster in that year.
Using Burglary as an example in the city mentioned above, two additional Days with
Disaster means, on average, an increase of approximately 300 Burglaries. Those Burglaries
would likely be investigated by a dedicated unit of several officers who would share the burden.
The unit would most likely need additional overtime funding to support the additional time spent
on investigations. One could also argue that more mistakes would be made across all the
investigations in that unit, due to the additional burden placed on the officers. Matters are worse
for departments that compartmentalize working units, where the same unit must, for example
investigate an increase of 300 Burglaries and 124 Auto Thefts.
Across the department, other units would also face increases that would result in similar
burdens on the unit. Crime scene investigators, evidence collection and storage, victim/witness
specialists, and other components of the department would also feel the effects of the increased
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operational tempo associated with the two additional Days with Disaster. Across the department,
the two extra Days with Disaster would likely also be associated with increased overtime
requirements and increased opportunities for mistakes. One can begin to see how, despite limited
effect sizes in the regression models, the findings from this study are important to law
enforcement planning efforts, not only at the individual unit level, but also across an entire
department, particularly in disaster prone communities.
Clarifying A Disaster Myth
These findings also add a bit of evidence related to disaster mythology. Nogami (2018)
and Quarantelli (2007) considered rampant Looting to be a disaster myth. They argued that
Looting is generally rare during disasters, and general crime could increase during disasters, but
only when paired with Social Disorganization factors such as socioeconomic disparity and
unemployment. However, these findings indicate that increased Days with Disasters generally
means increased crime in the cities studied, with and without Social Disorganization factors
integrated into the models. When combined with other recent macro level, longitudinal research
(Prelog, 2016; Spencer, 2017; Spencer & Stoble, 2019), one can see that weather-related
disasters can be generally associated with increased crime, including Looting or Burglary. This
seems to be particularly true when disasters are paired with Social Disorganization. Thus, based
on these findings, disaster looting should not be considered a disaster myth, particularly in
disorganized communities.
Establishing a Disaster Policing Paradigm
Taken together with other disaster crime research that indicates that some crimes increase
during disasters (Augusto, 2020; Prelog, 2016; Spencer, 2017), these findings suggest a need for
a disaster policing paradigm, applied in certain disaster-prone communities. This would be
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particularly important in communities with high Social Disorganization factors. Such a paradigm
might be a focused endeavor similar to community policing efforts and might incorporate a datadriven management approach to disaster policing, increased training, and the establishment of
additional disaster-related collateral duties and certifications for certain officers. At a minimum
this research provides increased evidence for government decision makers to understand the
increased burden of even a single additional Day with Disaster on a police agency.
A key component of a disaster policing paradigm would be the establishment of
management processes that deliberately incorporate an emphasis on the collection and review of
recent data and research as the foundation of their disaster law enforcement planning efforts.
Realistically, law enforcement agencies will rely heavily on their own experience in preparing
for disasters. However, maintaining awareness of research such as this might provide data to
assist in justifying requests for additional resources or funding toward disaster policing efforts.
One component of such a paradigm might be disaster-specific law enforcement training
and procedures. Disaster-specific training would be designed to prepare officers and supervisors
for changes to crime during disasters and environmental challenges unique to disasters. Law
enforcement supervisors might also undergo training that reflects military deployment training to
help supervisors support officers during increased environmental hazards, increased officer
fatigue, and extended shifts.
As part of the parardigm, law enforcement agencies in communities with a large number
of major weather events or disasters might also use these findings, along with others, to inform
their planning efforts. Such agencies might consider establishing scaleable and flexible cadres of
investigators cross-trained on Robbery, Burglary, Looting, and Auto Theft, with the
understanding that these crimes may be likely to increase during weather-related disasters, and
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are generally likely to increase as Days with Disaster increase, particularly in neighborhoods
with high Social Disorganization. Such units might be made up of volunteers who are then
certified in the role, similar to existing intermittent collateral duties in some agencies such as
Explosives Ordnance Disposal technicians, part-time Tactical Response Teams, Peer Support
Team members, or Youth Mentors. The cross-trained officers might be selected from the
officers’ whose primary responsbilities are known to decrease during disasters. In any case,
agencies would need to take deliberate efforts to forecast the changes to crime to inform their
data-driven planning using studies such as this one.
Victim assistance specialists might also find the study useful, since this study does show
a relationship between Days with Disaster and certain types of violence, which also aligns with
other research findings showing that disasters are linked to an increase in personal victimization,
interpersonal violence, and trauma (Gilmore et al., 2018; Yoshihama et al., 2019; Parkinson,
2019). Victim assistance agencies in disaster prone communities might forecast an increased
need for victim advocacy work during years with increased days with disaster or major weather
events. Additionally, communities have occasional for-warning from weather personnel that the
upcoming hurricane season, for example, will have a particularly high number of storms. Law
enforcement and victim assistance agencies might thus take preemptive steps to increase
preparedness, resources, training, and staffing to prepare for the impending increases in certain
crimes and victims.
Theoretical Implications
These findings consistently showed the Social Disorganization composite variable as
significantly linked to crime, which reinforces the role of Social Disorganization Theory factors
in relation to crime. Social Disorganization significantly predicted every crime being studied and
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was found to worsen the impact of Days with Disaster on Burglaries. This is not surprising given
the increases to Burglaries that have been observed during disasters (Augusto, 2020; Spencer,
2017; Spencer & Stoble, 2019). This study also supports an argument for Days with Disaster as a
bona fide Social Disorganization Theory factor, and this research proposes a UDC Theory that
provides a comprehensive explanation of disaster crime.
Research Implications
This study fills several gaps discussed earlier in the dissertation. A nexus between Days
with Disaster and crime has been established and the door has been opened exploring the role of
Social Disorganization in that relationship. Additionally, this study is the first longitudinal study
of disaster crime that uses the city as the level of analysis, which allows for a focus on the urban
areas where the human-nature interface is most pronounced and where social vulnerability and
Social Disorganization levels are likely to be high. Finally, this study extends the timeframe to
17 years of data, which is the second longest period of any disaster crime research in recent
years. The gaps filled above, particularly when combined with Spencer’s (2017) research and
Prelog’s (2016) longitudinal research lay a macro foundation establishing that increased crime
rates at the county and city level are indeed associated with weather-related disasters, particularly
when Social Disorganization is involved. In a field of study with so many apparently inconsistent
results, general associations between disaster and crime become an important starting point for
future research. The gaps filled by this study and associated research implications lead to
recommendations for future research.
Recommendations for Future Research
Further research should build upon this study and apply these findings as important
context for future disaster crime research. This research shows a relationship between Days with
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Disaster and certain crimes, in large urban areas. However, researchers looking for a set of
variables that fully explain crime will need to continue their search. Additional research should
continue to explore how Social Disorganization Theory factors fit into the picture of crime and
disaster, particularly with an eye toward UDC Theory. The body of work would also benefit
from a study comparing these findings to a set of 10 cities with less days with disasters.
In any case, when combined with the findings from the studies discussed in this
dissertation, one could argue that several sets of complex processes occur simultaneously during
disasters, and components of multiple theories are also at play. Researchers might thus focus on
studying the same disaster from multiple units of analysis and with varied frequency of data,
such as daily, weekly, monthly or yearly crime data. Researchers might now continue to narrow
the research focus to include other cities or spatial analysis at the zip code or police beat level of
analysis. Additionally, the body of work would benefit from research that delineates crime rates
during the pre-disaster, disaster, and disaster recovery periods to better understand changes to
crime through the disaster cycle. In any case, future research should focus on timing and
compliance of disaster warnings in relation to crime. Researchers should also explore Social
Disorganization as a mediator of the impact of Days with Disaster on crime. Such research,
depending upon the findings, might better establish Days with Disaster as a Social
Disorganization factor.
Conclusion
Overall, this study found that Days with Disaster significantly predicted Robbery,
Murder, Rape, Burglary, and Auto Theft, but did not significantly predict Larceny or Assault.
Additionally, Social Disorganization was also often found to predict crime, and the results
indicated that Social Disorganization, on average, worsened the impacts of Days with Disaster

121
on Burglary rates in the cities studied. These findings indicate that, on average, large cities can
expect increases to crime as days with major weather events and disasters increase, particularly
when those increases are paired with high levels of Social Disorganization. The findings advance
the body of disaster crime research and carry several practical and theoretical implications.
These findings might also suggest a need for police managers in disaster-prone
communities to establish a disaster policing paradigm, with a focus on training for disasterspecific concerns, and preparation for crimes that increase during disasters, particularly in the
more disorganized neighborhoods. This study also proposes a UDC Theory that incorporates RA
Theory, Rational Choice Theory, and Social Disorganization Theory. Additionally, although this
research presents important general associations between disaster and crime in urban areas,
disaster crime researchers can more systematically advance the body of work by studying their
chosen disaster from multiple units of analysis and with varied frequency of data. Future disaster
crime research should also incorporate disaster phases, and timing, as well as compliance with
disaster warnings. Social Disorganization should also be explored as a potential mediator
between Days with Disaster and crime, to better understand Days with Disaster as a bona fide
Social Disorganization Theory factor.
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